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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as 
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted. 
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended 
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries 
are grouped by subject matter. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Top   
 
Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State 
In Alaskan Crude Corp. v. State,
1
 the supreme court held that the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (“Commission”) can deny an oil and gas exploration facility’s application for an 
exemption from oil discharge requirements.
2
 Alaskan Crude applied to the Commission to 
reopen a well for exploration.
3
 Statutes mandated that oil exploration facilities have a discharge 
prevention plan, but exempted gas exploration facilities from the requirement.
4
 A gas exploration 
facility, according to the statutes, has the sole purpose of exploring for natural gas.
5
 Therefore, 
the Commission rejected Alaskan Crude’s request for the discharge exemption because it found 
Alaskan Crude’s facility to not be a gas facility.6 On appeal, Alaskan Crude challenged the 
Commission’s facility classification.7 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that a court should defer to an agency’s factual findings supported by substantial 
evidence.
8
 Accordingly, because Alaskan Crude represented that it would explore for oil as well 
as gas, and because Alaskan Crude also planned to keep any oil it recovered while exploring for 
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gas, the Commission could classify the facility as one not solely used for the exploration of gas.
9
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Commission can deny an 
oil and gas exploration facility’s application for an exemption from oil discharge requirements.10 
 
Bachner Co. v. Weed 
In Bachner Co. v. Weed,
11
 the supreme court held that suits against individual procurement 
officers for good-faith acts performed within the course and scope of their official duties are 
barred by the exclusive remedy statute.
12
 Bachner Company and Bowers Investment Company 
(together the “Companies”) bid for a state building contract but did not receive it.13 Four 
members of the procurement committee for the contract were involved in irregularities while 
operating the bid scoring process.
14
 These irregularities included making untrue statements and 
changing scores to correct for perceived bias.
15
 The Companies sued the committee members in 
their individual capacities.
16
 On appeal, the Companies argued that the exclusive remedy statute 
did not bar their suits because the committee members’ conduct demonstrated bad faith.17 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that these particular irregularities 
did not indicate bad faith.
18
 The court further reasoned that, because the acts constituting the 
irregularities were performed in the course and scope of the committee members’ official duties, 
the Companies’ suits could be characterized as a claim against an agency.19 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that the exclusive remedy statute bars suits against 
individual procurement officers for good-faith acts performed within the course and scope of 
their official duties.
20
 
 
Griswold v. Homer City Council 
In Griswold v. Homer City Council,
21
 the supreme court held that a municipality that expends 
significant resources responding to a public records request acts reasonably and in good faith 
even when the request is not fully complied with.
22
 In 2008, the Homer City Council approved a 
bond proposition and issued an election brochure to go with it.
23
 Griswold, alleging the brochure 
constituted an illegal use of municipal funds to influence a ballot measure, filed a public records 
request for emails and documents relating to the brochure with the City Manager.
24
 The Manager 
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eventually produced all of the emails requested, except privileged emails or those that had been 
routinely deleted.
25
 The lower court noted that the Manager need only “make a good faith and 
reasonable effort to locate records,” which was supported by the fact that the Manager not only 
purchased state of the art record retrieval software but spent nearly six months complying with 
Griswold’s request.26 On appeal, Griswold argued that the Manager had not fully complied with 
his request, that the email search was inadequate and that the City had unlawfully failed to 
preserve public records.
27
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, adopting the 
aforementioned reasoning as well.
28
 The court further reasoned that the Manager’s compliance 
was reasonable because the Manager had spent approximately fifty hours responding to Griswold 
and that it would have cost the city an additional five to ten thousand dollars to fully comply with 
Griswold’s request.29 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that where a 
municipality expends significant resources responding to a public records request, it does so 
reasonably and in good faith even when the request is not fully complied with.
30
 
 
L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage,
31
 the supreme court held that the voting 
requirements of Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) do not apply to special assessment districts.
32
 In 
1997, the Anchorage Assembly created Special Assessment District 1 SD97.
 33
 While this 
assessment district originally included the building at 420 L Street, a property owned by L Street 
Investments, the property was eventually carved out of the district.
34
 Nevertheless, in 2010, the 
Assembly renewed and expanded the district to include the property.
35
 L Street Investments filed 
a complaint for declaratory judgment against the municipality claiming that the voting rules 
required by the statute to expand an assessment district were not followed.
36
 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) was inapplicable 
to assessment districts since they were creatures of pure municipal law.
37
 Thus, according to the 
court, the statute’s voting requirements did not need to be followed to expand the assessment 
district to include L Street Investments’ property.38 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that the voting requirements of Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) do not apply to 
special assessment districts.
39
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Rollins v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety 
In Rollins v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety,40 the supreme court held that the owner of a 
commercial liquor license has the burden of proof when challenging a decision from the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Board (the “Board”) denying a waiver of the annual operating requirements.41 
In 1990, Rollins purchased a liquor license.
42
 Each year from 1991 to 1994, Rollins applied for, 
and was granted, a waiver of the annual operating requirement, which required operation of at 
least thirty eight-hour days a year.
43
 In 1995, Rollins applied again but was denied a waiver by 
the Board.
44
 Rollins sued and eventually agreed to a settlement granting her a waiver for 1995 
but barring the issuance of any future waivers without a showing of good cause.
45
 In 2010, 
Rollins applied for another waiver, which the Board denied.
46
 On appeal, Rollins argued that the 
Board should have the burden of proof to show that she had not satisfied the operating 
requirement.
47
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that having the 
requirement waived was a privilege.
48
 Thus, according to the court, Rollins properly had the 
burden of proof to show either that the requirement was met or that there was good cause for it 
not being met.
49
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the owner of a 
commercial liquor licensee has the burden of proof when challenging a decision from the Board 
denying a waiver of the annual operating requirements.
50
 
 
Sosa De Rosario v. Chenega Lodging 
In Sosa De Rosario v. Chenega Lodging,
51
 the supreme court held that in reviewing claims, the 
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (the “Commission”) must defer to the Workers’ 
Compensation Board’s (the “Board”) credibility determinations.52 Rosario fell when working at 
Chenega Lodging (“Chenega”), experienced a back injury and subsequently received temporary 
disability benefit payments from Chenega.
53
 Rosario’s physician reported that her injury resulted 
from her fall at work and that her injury would be chronic.
54
 However, Chenega’s independent 
medical evaluator concluded that Rosario’s condition was caused by age-related degenerative 
changes.
55
 Chenega and Rosario then appeared before the Board, which decided that Rosario did 
suffer a compensable work-related injury.
56
 The Commission later reversed the Board’s decision, 
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concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings.57 On appeal, 
Chenega argued that the Board improperly ignored one of its doctor’s testimony during the initial 
hearing because it found the doctor’s testimony not credible.58 The supreme court reversed the 
Commission’s decision, reasoning that it is the Board’s responsibility to be the fact finder and 
determine credibility in these hearings.
59
 Thus, according to the court, the Commission could not 
reverse the Board’s credibility findings as it did here and the doctor’s testimony could be given 
little weight.
60
 Reversing the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that in reviewing 
claims, the Commission must defer to the Board’s credibility determinations.61 
 
State v. Estrada 
In State v. Estrada,
62
 the supreme court held that the Board of Fisheries (the “Board”) may enact 
regulations that allow the Department of Fish and Game (the “Department”) to specify 
limitations on fishing through the issuance of fishing permits.
63
 The Board was given authority to 
adopt regulations for conserving and developing fisheries.
64
 Accordingly, it promulgated 
regulations that required fishermen to obtain permits from the Department, also giving the 
Department authority to impose conditions upon said permits.
65
 When the Department 
discovered that the sockeye salmon population had fallen dangerously low, it reduced the annual 
catch limit for sockeye salmon.
66
 Subsequently, Estrada and two other fishermen were charged 
with violating terms of their fishing permits by exceeding this limit.
67
 On appeal, the fishermen 
argued that the Board exceeded its authority by delegating the aforementioned decision-making 
to the Department.
68
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that courts 
should generally defer to an administrative agency’s statutory interpretation.69 Thus, according to 
the court, since such challenged authority was ultimately a question of legislative intent, the 
Board’s interpretation must prevail since analogous authority had been exercised without 
intervention from the legislature for decades.
70
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that the Board may enact regulations that allow the Department to specify limitations 
on fishing through the Department’s issuance of fishing permits.71 
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BUSINESS LAW 
Top   
 
Brown v. Knowles 
In Brown v. Knowles,
72
 the supreme court held that an employee’s veil-piercing claim is not 
barred during the corporation’s bankruptcy proceedings.73 Brown, the sole shareholder of 
International Steel, entered into an agreement with Knowles, an employee, for a bonus 
compensation package but eventually stopped paying.
74
 Knowles subsequently filed suit against 
International Steel and Brown in the lower court one day before International Steel filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
75
 In the lower court, Knowles received a monetary award.
76
 
On appeal, Brown argued that Knowles’ veil-piercing claim was barred by International Steel’s 
bankruptcy proceedings.
77
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
International Steel, and not Brown, was the debtor in the bankruptcy proceedings.
78
 Thus, 
according to the court, since the veil-piercing claim was against Brown and not the corporation, 
Brown was not entitled to bankruptcy protection since he never filed for bankruptcy.
79
 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an employee’s veil-piercing claim is not 
barred during the corporation’s bankruptcy proceedings.80 
 
McCarter v. McCarter 
In McCarter v. McCarter,
81
 the supreme court held that, without filing a motion for relief from 
judgment, the court will not modify an agreement that has previously been incorporated into a 
final dissolution decree.
82
 Deborah McCarter filed a motion in the lower court for enforcement of 
a property agreement that was incorporated into her divorce decree with her ex-husband, 
David.
83
 The lower court granted Deborah’s motion.84 On appeal, David argued that, due to 
inaccuracies contained in the agreement, the lower court erred in failing to modify it.
85
 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the court could not modify the 
contract on a piecemeal basis when the parties’ property rights had previously been adjudicated 
and incorporated into a final judgment.
86
 Thus, without a separate filing of a motion for relief 
from judgment, the court’s job was to interpret and enforce the agreement based on the principles 
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of contract law.
87
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the court will 
not modify an agreement that has previously been incorporated into a final dissolution decree 
without the filing of a motion for relief from judgment.
88
 
 
Tesoro Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue 
In Tesoro Corp. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,89 the supreme court held that parent corporations 
maintaining significant oversight of its subsidiaries are subject to taxation under the unitary 
business apportionment method.
90
 Between 1969 and 1994, Tesoro’s operations in Alaska were 
treated as a unitary business and taxed as such.
91
 However in 1995, its purchase of the Kenai 
Pipeline (“KPL”) made Tesoro “engaged in the transportation of oil or gas by pipeline,” 
subjecting itself to additional taxation.
92
 To avoid some of this new tax, Tesoro claimed that 
some of its subsidiaries (including KPL) were not unitary and, accordingly, only those non-
unitary business segments were subject to this additional tax.
93
 On appeal, Tesoro argued that the 
administrative law judge erred because of the corporation’s passive investment approach 
regarding the aforementioned subsidiaries.
94
 The supreme court affirmed the administrative 
judge’s decision, reasoning that Tesoro’s provision of credit facilities, financing, oversight, 
guidance and central management to its subsidiaries rendered it, and all of the subsidiaries at 
issue, a unitary business.
95
 These interactions, according to the court, demonstrated Tesoro’s 
continued control and influence over its subsidiaries, which resulted in considerable savings.
96
 
Affirming the administrative law judge’s decision, the supreme court held that parent 
corporations maintaining significant oversight of its subsidiaries are subject to taxation under the 
unitary business apportionment method.
97
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Top   
 
Alaskan Adventure Tours v. City and Borough of Yakutat 
In Alaskan Adventure Tours v. City and Borough of Yakutat,
98
 the supreme court held that when 
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment based on fraud, the lower court may require a 
showing that the fraud could not have been discovered by due diligence before or during trial.
99
 
In 2010, Yakutat filed suit against Adventure Tours for fraudulent conveyance of its assets to 
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avoid payment of taxes that it owed.
100
 After finding that Adventure Tours had notice that it 
owed taxes at the time it transferred the assets, the lower court ruled against them.
101
 
Subsequently, Adventure Tours motioned the court for relief from this judgment under Rule 
60(b)(3), claiming that one of Yakutat’s witnesses had lied about a conversation with the owner 
of Adventure Tours.
102
 This conversation was one of the ways that Yakutat had demonstrated 
Adventure Tours had notice of the taxes it owed prior to transferring the assets.
103
 On appeal, 
Adventure Tours argued that the lower court had applied the wrong standard by requiring them 
to prove that the fraud could not have been timely shown during the fraudulent conveyance 
trial.
104
 The supreme affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Rule 60(b)(3) was not 
meant to be a backup plan for litigants that failed to adequately investigate their case or cross-
examine an adverse witness the first time around.
105
 Rather, Rule 60(b)(3) was meant to provide 
relief for parties who were unable to fully and fairly litigate their original case.
106
 Affirming the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that when a movant had ample opportunity to 
uncover or demonstrate the alleged fraud or perjury during trial, relief under Rule 60(b)(3) may 
be denied.
107
 
 
American Marine Corp. v. Sholin 
In American Marine Corp. v. Sholin,
108
 the supreme court held that the State’s savings statute 
does not require timely notice.
109
 In 2005, Sholin was provided medical services by American 
Marine Corporation (the “Corporation”).110 The Corporation asserted that Sholin’s insurer had 
given them oral authorization to provide the services.
111
 Nevertheless, Sholin’s insurer 
subsequently denied the Corporation’s requests for payment.112 In response, the Corporation 
commenced an action for breach of contract against Sholin and her insurer.
113
 The lower court 
initially dismissed the claim for lack of service, prompting the Corporation to re-file the lawsuit 
almost a full year later.
114
 The lower court then granted summary judgment to the defendant 
since the defendant was not notified of the Corporation’s initial claim until after the statute of 
limitations had run.
115
 On appeal, the Corporation argued that the plain meaning of the savings 
statute allowed for a timely filed action not dismissed on its merits to be re-filed within one year 
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116
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that the savings statute plainly did not require timely notice.
117
 The court 
further reasoned that the purpose of the savings statute was to “facilitate resolution of suits on the 
merits.”118 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the State’s savings 
statute does not require timely notice.
119
 
 
Bearden v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.  
In Bearden v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
120
 the supreme court held that pleading no 
contest to a disorderly conduct charge collaterally estops re-litigating the essential elements of 
that crime in a civil declaratory judgment action regarding insurance coverage.
121
 After a 
physical altercation with an acquaintance, Bearden pled no contest to disorderly conduct, which 
is a serious criminal offense.
122
 A civil complaint stemming from the same incident was 
subsequently filed against Bearden who, in turn, looked to his insurance for coverage.
123
 On 
appeal, Bearden argued that he acted in self-defense.
124
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that pleading no contest when given the opportunity for a full and fair 
hearing necessarily meant the absence of self-defense had been decided.
125
 Thus, according to 
the court, Bearden could not rely on the insurance policy for coverage.
126
 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that pleading no contest to a disorderly conduct charge 
collaterally estops re-litigating the essential elements of that crime in a civil declaratory 
judgment action regarding insurance coverage.
127
 
 
Chloe O. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Chloe O. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,128 the supreme court held that when 
reviewing a lower court’s holding that was made during a new hearing, review is based only on 
the evidence before the court during the new hearing.
129
 The Office of Children Service (“OCS”) 
filed suit to terminate Chloe’s parental rights based on her history of drug abuse, suicide 
attempts, violent behavior and her predilection towards unsafe people and situations.
130
 After a 
trial, the lower court terminated Chloe’s rights.131 Chloe appealed but during briefing before the 
supreme court, the parties agreed that the case should be remanded because the lower court had 
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applied the wrong evidentiary standard to the question of whether OCS had made active efforts 
to reunify the family.
132
 On remand, before a new judge, Chloe asked for and was granted a new 
evidentiary hearing.
133
 Ultimately, the lower court in the new hearing determined, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that OCS had made extraordinary efforts to reunify the family.
134
 On 
appeal, Chloe argued that the lower court erred because it ignored the testimony of a witness 
from the first hearing.
135
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
the witness’ testimony was not before the lower court when it made its ruling on remand.136 
Furthermore, Chloe was adamant that the new judge “not base her decision on a review of the 
evidence presented to” the first judge.137 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that when reviewing a lower court’s holding that was made during a new hearing, review is 
based only on the evidence before the court during the new hearing.
138
 
 
Dixon v. Blackwell 
In Dixon v. Blackwell
139
, the supreme court held that an ambiguous statement in a closing 
argument does not constitute a judicial admission.
140
 After failing to reach an agreement in 
arbitration regarding payment of her medical expenses, Dixon filed a complaint against 
Blackwell.
141
 At trial, Blackwell’s attorney estimated that Dixon’s related medical expenses 
could be around $17,955, but the jury awarded only $12,710.
142
 On appeal, Dixon argued that 
Blackwell’s attorney’s estimation of medical expenses constituted a judicial admission and 
because the jury’s verdict was lower than the estimated amount, the amount awarded must 
necessarily be inadequate.
143
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning 
that a judicial admission must be “clear, deliberate, and unequivocal.”144 Here, according to the 
court, if Blackwell’s attorney’s estimation of medical expenses is taken in context, it did not 
meet the aforementioned standard for judicial admissions and, therefore, could not establish the 
inadequacy of the awarded amount.
145
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that an ambiguous statement in a closing argument does not constitute a judicial 
admission.
146
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Hill v. Giani 
In Hill v. Giani,
147
 the supreme court held that summary judgment is inappropriate where the 
movant is protected by qualified official immunity subject to a good faith requirement and the 
nonmovant presents some admissible evidence that the official acted in bad faith.
148
 Giani, an 
independent care coordinator for the State Department of Health and Social Services, filed a 
Report of Harm (the “Report”) against Hill, the owner of an assisted living home for mentally 
handicapped adults, alleging various forms of abuse.
149
 However, while an investigation into the 
Report revealed that some allegations contained therein were valid, there was no evidence to 
substantiate the abuse allegations.
150
 Subsequently, Hill filed suit against Giani alleging 
defamation and various other claims.
151
 The lower court granted summary judgment for Giani on 
the basis of statutory immunity.
152
 On appeal, Giani argued that the investigation proved the 
validity of some of the allegations and, in turn, demonstrated Giani’s good faith in filing the 
report.
153
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the investigation 
was not relevant to the issue of Giani’s personal good faith in filing the Report.154 The court 
further reasoned that Hill provided some admissible evidence that could show bad faith by Giani 
in filing the Report.
155
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
summary judgment is inappropriate where the movant is protected by qualified official immunity 
subject to a good faith requirement and the nonmovant provides some admissible evidence of 
bad faith.
156
  
 
Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co. 
In Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co.,
157
 the supreme court held that a claim mentioned but not 
explicitly asserted as a claim in one lawsuit sometimes may not be barred by res judicata in a 
second suit.
158
 In 2008, Patterson sued Infinity Insurance Co. (“Infinity”), claiming that they 
acted in bad faith by failing to timely pay some of Patterson’s medical bills after a car 
accident.
159
 The lower court granted Infinity’s motion for summary judgment but noted that the 
embezzlement claim that Patteron’s complaint mentioned did not relate to the underlying claims 
and, consequently, would not be considered.
160
 Six months later, Patterson filed a new suit that 
specifically included the embezzlement claim.
161
 On appeal, Infinity argued that Patterson’s new 
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suit was barred by res judicata.
162
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that Patterson’s embezzlement claim dealt with a distinct harm from that alleged in the 
first suit.
163
 It was distinct because although there would be some overlapping evidence, the new 
claim did not stem from conduct resulting from the car accident.
164
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that a claim mentioned but not explicitly asserted as a claim in 
one lawsuit sometimes may not be barred by res judicata in a second suit.
165
 
 
Jackson v. Sey 
In Jackson v. Sey,
166
 the supreme court held that a post-judgment motion for relief from 
judgment is not subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution under Rule 41(e).
167
 In 2008, the 
lower court granted a divorce to Sey and her husband Jackson after Jackson failed to appear at a 
hearing telephonically from jail.
168
 Jackson subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment, 
which would relieve him of the issued divorce obligations.
169
 While the lower court allowed 
limited discovery into the issue, the court ultimately dismissed the motion for lack of 
prosecution.
170
 On appeal, Jackson argued the lower court erred in not considering the merits of 
his aforementioned motion.
171
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning 
that lack of prosecution under Rule 41(e) only applies to pending cases.
172
 Thus, according to the 
court, since a final judgment was entered, there could be no lack of prosecution of a pending 
case.
173
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a post-judgment 
motion for relief from judgment is not subject to dismissal for lack of prosecution under Rule 
41(e).
174
 
 
Schultz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
In Schultz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
175
 the supreme court held that only a favorable verdict, not 
the most desired verdict, is necessary to be the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under 
Alaska Civil Rule 82.
176
 The Trust Advisory Committee (the “Committee”) sought information 
on its property insurance premiums and coverage from its trustee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
(“Wells Fargo”).177 Unsatisfied with Wells Fargo’s responses, the Committee petitioned the 
lower court for relief and its attorneys’ fees, arguing that by failing to provide requested 
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information, Wells Fargo breached its fiduciary duty.
178
 The lower court ultimately found that 
neither party had clearly prevailed in the action and, consequently, did not award the Committee 
its attorneys’ fees.179 On appeal, the Committee argued that the lower court misinterpreted 
Alaska Civil Rule 82.
180
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
the prevailing party in a civil suit was the party who received a favorable verdict on the case’s 
main issue.
181
 Here, since the Committee successfully obtained a court order compelling Wells 
Fargo to fulfill its fiduciary obligations by surrendering the insurance policy as well as half of the 
Committee’s requested documents, it was the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees.182 
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that only a favorable verdict is 
necessary to be the prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82.183 
 
Steven v. Nicole 
In Steven v. Nicole,
184
 the supreme court held that a court does not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to cede jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum in a visitation dispute under the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) if it provides sufficient reasoning to 
infer that it considered the relevant statutory factors.
185
 Following the couple’s divorce in 2004, 
and in contravention of Nicole’s visitation rights, Steven refused to allow Nicole to take the 
children from Tennessee in May 2012.
186
 Nicole filed a motion in Alaska to enforce her 
visitation rights but failed to pass a timely drug test in order to get custody of the children.
187
 The 
lower court held that Nicole could enforce her rights over Christmas if she passed a drug test one 
month in advance.
188
 On appeal, Steven claimed that the lower court should have voluntarily 
ceded jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum to Tennessee.
189
 The supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that a court must articulate why a motion for inconvenient 
forum was denied under the UCCJEA by use of the established statutory factors.
190
 Thus, 
according to the court, the lower court’s explanation, while not explicitly referring to the 
aforementioned factors, was satisfactory because it demonstrated that the factors had been 
considered.
191
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a court does not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant an inconvenient forum motion in a visitation dispute 
under the UCCJEA if it provides sufficient reasoning to infer that it considered the relevant 
statutory factors.
192
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Top   
 
Barber v. State, Dep’t of Corrections 
In Barber v. State, Dep’t of Corrections,193 the supreme court held that requiring a prisoner to 
pay filing fees in order to appeal a Department of Corrections (“DOC”) disciplinary proceeding 
is a denial of the prisoner’s due process rights when that prisoner has an actual inability to pay.194 
Barber sought judicial review of two DOC disciplinary proceedings.
195
 His appeals were rejected 
because he was unable to pay even the reduced filing fee required by the court.
196
 On appeal, 
Barber argued that the filing fee statute deprived him of his due process rights.
197
 The supreme 
court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Barber had a due process interest in 
avoiding punitive segregation and in obtaining judicial review of his DOC proceedings.
198
 The 
court further reasoned that without judicial review there was a significant risk of erroneous 
deprivation of his interests and that the state’s legitimate interest in reducing frivolous prisoner 
litigation did not justify denying Barber his due process right of access to courts.
199
 Reversing 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that it is a denial of due process to require a 
prisoner to pay filing fees that he is actually unable to afford.
200
  
 
Blaufuss v. Ball 
In Blaufuss v. Ball,
201
 the supreme court held that due process rights are not violated by a 
decision based purely on non-expert testimony when proper notice is received and both parties 
have the opportunity to present their own evidence.
202
 In 2006, Ball filed for divorce from 
Blaufuss.
203
 At trial, Ball stated that he had supported Blaufuss for a number of years while 
separated but argued that he should no longer be required to do so because of Blaufuss’ ability to 
hold a job as well as her drug abuse problems.
204
 Blaufuss’ sister, however, explained that 
Blaufuss suffered from a documented mental illness and was in dire economic straights but 
provided no supporting documentation.
205
 The trial court found that Blaufuss suffered from 
mental illness and chronic substance abuse, and, consequently, found her unemployable.
206
 
Accordingly, Ball was ordered to pay Blaufuss spousal support.
207
 In 2010, after not receiving 
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her payments, Blaufuss moved to find Ball in contempt of court.
208
 In response, Ball argued he 
had been deprived of due process at the divorce trial because the trial court made its decision 
without any financial or medical documentation supporting Blaufuss’ allegations.209 The lower 
court agreed with Ball’s due process argument.210 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that because Ball had received proper notice of the issues to be decided at 
trial and, furthermore, was not barred from presenting his own evidence at trial, his due process 
rights were not violated by the trial court’s ruling.211 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that due process rights are not violated by a ruling based purely on non-
expert testimony when proper notice is received and both parties have the opportunity to present 
their own evidence.
212
 
 
Debra P. v. Laurence S. 
In Debra P. v. Laurence S.,
213
 the supreme court held that changing a child custody hearing to a 
final trial without proper notice violates due process.
214
 Debra P. and Laurence S. were in dispute 
over who should have legal and physical custody of their child.
215
 The lower court judge ordered 
an evidentiary hearing on September 21 for an interim order, allowing Debra P. and Laurence S. 
more time to work towards a settlement.
216
 However, at the September 21 hearing, the court 
granted Laurence S. custody and announced that its order would be final.
217
 On appeal, Debra P. 
argued that the lower court denied her the opportunity to fully present her case by changing the 
hearing to a final custody trial without giving proper, prior notice.
218
 The supreme court reversed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that procedural due process required that parties receive 
proper, prior notice in custody hearings.
219
 Here, the lower court’s comments would have led 
most people to believe only interim custody would be determined at the September 21 hearing 
and the lower court only told the parties its intention to make a final ruling after both parties had 
made their presentations.
220
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
changing a child custody hearing to a final trial without proper notice violates due process.
221
 
 
DesJarlais v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor 
In DesJarlais v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor,
222
 the supreme court held that the 
lieutenant governor properly refuses to certify a citizen-proposed initiative when it is clearly 
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unconstitutional.
223
 DesJarlais submitted an initiative to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor 
that would result in a general ban on abortion.
224
 The Lieutenant Governor consulted the 
Department of Law and concluded that the initiative was unconstitutional and therefore did not 
circulate it.
225
 DesJarlais then filed a complaint in the lower court.
226
 The lower court granted 
summary judgment to the State because a law banning abortion was clearly unconstitutional 
under controlling federal and state precedents.
227
 On appeal, DesJarlais argued that Roe v. Wade 
was not controlling precedent and that the Alaska Constitution required the State to protect the 
natural rights of all people, including preborn children.
228
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that the initiative was clearly unconstitutional under controlling 
federal and state precedents.
229
 Accordingly, stated the court, the lieutenant governor could not 
act against an established constitutional right and therefore properly denied to circulate the 
initiative.
230
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the lieutenant 
governor properly refuses to certify a citizen-proposed initiative when it is clearly 
unconstitutional.
231
 
 
Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue 
In Heller v. Dep’t of Revenue,232 the supreme court held that the six-month residency 
requirements necessary to be eligible for the Permanent Fund Dividend (“PFD”) cannot be 
circumvented even when absence is involuntary.
233
 In 2005, Heller, a military member, was 
posted in Alaska and subsequently took several steps to establish residency.
234
 Following 
deployment on August 14, 2005, he did not return to Alaska until December 11, 2006.
235
 In 
2007, Heller applied for a PFD but was denied for failing to satisfy the six consecutive month 
residency requirement.
236
 On appeal, Heller argued that his deployment was an “allowable 
absence” under the eligibility requirements.237 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that Heller’s interpretation ran contrary to both the plain language of the 
statute as well as its underlying legislative intent.
238
 Because the legislature sought to prevent 
potential abuses of the PFD by those with no intention of becoming permanent residents of 
Alaska, the court concluded that the residency requirements could not be circumvented even 
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when absence from the state was involuntary.
239
 The court further reasoned that the eligibility 
requirements were constitutional because they facilitated the State’s interest in ensuring that only 
bona fide residents received PFD payments.
240
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that the six-month residency requirements necessary to be eligible for the Permanent 
Fund Dividend (“PFD”) cannot be circumvented even when absence is involuntary.241 
 
Moore v. State 
In Moore v. State,
242
 the court of appeals held that the State’s sexual abuse statute criminalizing 
sexually enticing minors online is constitutional.
243
 Moore was convicted of online enticement of 
a minor under the sexual abuse statute after he asked two chat room participants, police officers 
posing as fourteen-year-old girls, to masturbate for him.
244
 Moore appealed his conviction, 
arguing that the online enticement statute was unconstitutional because it restricted free 
speech.
245
 The statute forbids an adult from enticing, soliciting or encouraging either a child 
under age sixteen or a person that the offender believes is under age sixteen from engaging in 
sexual activities with him or her.
246
 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.
247
 Here, the State has a compelling interest in protecting minors from online sexual 
predators.
248
 Furthermore, the statue is not overbroad because it requires the State to prove that 
the offender intended to cause the child to engage in sexual conduct.
249
 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the State’s sexual abuse statute criminalizing 
sexually enticing minors online is constitutional.
250
 
 
Patrick v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Patrick v. Municipality of Anchorage,
251
 the supreme court held that due process does not 
always require a full pre-revocation hearing when an informal opportunity to respond to 
allegations is presented prior to a license revocation.
252
 After Patrick, a taxi-driver, was cited for 
driving with a suspended license, she repeatedly communicated with the transportation inspector 
charged with investigating the violation, arguing that she was not driving the vehicle that 
night.
253
 Nevertheless, the transportation inspector revoked her chauffeur license based on his 
classification of her as a chronic violator.
254
 Patrick requested a hearing where her license 
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revocation was reaffirmed.
255
 On appeal, Patrick argued that her due process rights were violated 
because her license was revoked prior to a hearing.
256
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that Patrick’s conversations with the transportation satisfied due 
process in this instance by giving her sufficient notice that her license was going to be revoked as 
well as an opportunity to respond to the evidence against her.
257
 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that due process does not always require a full pre-revocation 
hearing when an informal opportunity to respond to allegations is presented prior to a license 
revocation.
258
 
 
State v. Doe A 
In State v. Doe A,
259
 the supreme court held that decisions by two-to-one majorities of the 
supreme court prior to November 10, 2010, have precedential effect because Appellate Rule 
106(b) does not apply retroactively.
260
 In 2008, the supreme court held in a two-to-one decision 
that amendments made in 1998 by the Alaska Legislature to Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration 
Act (“ASORA”) violated the State’s Ex Post Facto Clause and, accordingly, could not apply to 
individuals who committed their crimes before those amendments became effective.
261
 On 
November 10, 2010, Appellate Rule 106(b) was promulgated, providing that two-to-one 
decisions of the supreme court did not have precedential effect.
262
 John Doe A and John Doe B 
were convicted prior to the 1998 amendments of separate crimes requiring them to register and 
comply with ASORA.
263
 After Appellate Rule 106(b) was promulgated, they challenged the 
application of the 1998 amendments to them on the same Ex Post Facto grounds.
264
 On appeal, 
the State argued that Appellate Rule 106(b) should be given retroactive effect, thus eliminating 
the precedential value of the 2008 case, because it was a procedural rule and because its post-
adoption history demonstrated retroactivity was intended.
265
 The supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that Appellate Rule 106(b) was substantive since retroactively 
eliminating two-to-one decisions as precedent would eliminate rights created by those decisions, 
implicate public policy decisions and affect the results of future litigants’ cases.266 The supreme 
court further reasoned that the post-adoption history did not clearly indicate an express intent of 
retroactive application.
267
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
decisions by two-to-one majorities of the supreme court prior to Appellate Rule 106(b)’s 
promulgation have precedential effect.
268
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Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands 
In Sullivan v. Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands,
269
 the supreme court held that 
land development statutes limiting the State’s evaluation duty to only a single best interest 
finding (a “BIF”) are constitutional.270 In evaluating the Beaufort Sea Lease Sale Area for 
potential development, the Department of Natural Resources (the “Department”) issued a single 
BIF in favor of disposing of the land beginning with a phase of lease sales.
271
 The Department’s 
actions were pursuant to a recently amended statute that permitted the State to evaluate the 
environmental, cultural and communal effects of developing land only so far as this first phase of 
leasing was concerned.
272
 Subsequently, Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous 
Lands (“REDOIL”) successfully petitioned the lower court, arguing that the statute was 
unconstitutional because it did not require subsequent BIFs at each phase of develop.
273
 On 
appeal, the Department argued that the lower court erred in finding that the statute contravened 
the Alaska Constitution.
274
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
under the Alaska Constitution the Department’s only duty was to maximize the benefit to 
Alaskans in developing the State’s resources.275 Thus, according to the court, since BIFs were 
mere legislative conventions to achieve this end, the legislature had broad, constitutional 
discretion to limit them to the first phase of development.
276
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that land development statutes limiting the State’s evaluation 
duty to only a single BIF are constitutional.
277
 
 
Titus v. State, Dep’t of Administration 
In Titus v. State, Dep’t of Administration,278 the supreme court held that suspending a driver’s 
license for failure to carry liability insurance after involvement in a single-vehicle accident was 
not a violation of equal protection, substantive due process or procedural due process.
279
 In 2008, 
Titus was involved in a single motorcycle accident, resulting in minor personal injuries and 
damage to his motorcycle.
280
 Titus told the responding officer that he had insurance coverage.
281
 
However, the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) subsequently notified Titus, who in fact 
did not have insurance, that his license would be suspended for ninety days after failing to 
provide proof of insurance within fifteen days of the accident.
282
 The DMV hearing officer 
ultimately suspended Titus’ license and the lower court upheld this decision.283 On appeal, Titus 
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argued that the suspension was a violation of equal protection as well as substantive and 
procedural due processes.
284
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, noting that 
the purpose of the proof-of-insurance statute was to discover and deter uninsured driving.
285
 The 
court reasoned that there was no equal protection issue because all drivers were required to have 
insurance.
286
 The court further reasoned that substantive and procedural due processes were not 
violated as the failure to carry liability insurance was related to a person’s fitness to drive.287 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that suspending a driver’s license 
for failure to carry liability insurance in a single-vehicle accident was not a violation of equal 
protection, substantive due process or procedural due process.
288
 
 
CONTRACT LAW 
Top   
 
Brooks v. Hollaar 
In Brooks v. Hollaar,
289
 the supreme court held that the named payee on a promissory note has 
an economic interest in repayment and thus has standing to sue to collect on the loan regardless 
of the loan’s proceeds origination.290 Between 2005 and 2006, Hollaar loaned $266,430 to 
Brooks and his wife in a series of four promissory notes.
291
 Initially, the money for the loans 
belonged to Hollaar’s father, mother and sister.292 They transferred the funds into Hollaar’s bank 
account and he then transferred the funds to Brooks.
293
 Brooks failed to repay the loans within 
the notes’ allotted time frames and Hollaar filed suit in 2009 in order to recover his losses.294 The 
lower court entered judgment in Hollaar’s favor on all four promissory notes.295 On appeal, 
Brooks argued that because the money for the loans did not originate from Hollaar’s bank 
account, he had no economic interest in the performance of the notes and could only sue for 
nominal damages, not full contract damages.
296
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that Hollaar’s economic interest arose from his status as named payee on the 
promissory notes.
297
 The court further reasoned that Brooks’ contention was irrelevant because 
Hollaar was the funds transferor for all four notes as well.
298
 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that the named payee on a promissory note has an economic 
interest in repayment and thus has standing to sue to collect on the loan.
299
 
                                                 
284
 Id. 
285
 Id. at 1278. 
286
 Id. at 1277. 
287
 Id. at 1280.  
288
 Id. at 1283. 
289
 297 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2013). 
290
 Id. at 128. 
291
 Id. at 127. 
292
 Id. 
293
 Id. 
294
 Id. 
295
 Id. 
296
 Id. at 128. 
297
 Id. 
298
 Id. 
299
 Id. 
 Calais Company, Inc. v. Ivy 
In Calais Company, Inc. v. Ivy,
300
 the supreme court held that appraisers must comply with 
appraisal provisions in a settlement agreements.
301
 Calais Company (the “Company”) and 
shareholder Ivy reached a settlement agreement in which the Company would buy Ivy’s shares at 
a value to be determined by a panel of three appraisers.
302
 The three appraisers differed in their 
valuations, two ignoring liabilities and just calculating the fair market value of the Company.
303
 
On appeal, the Company argued that the two aforementioned appraisers’ valuations did not 
comply with the settlement agreement.
304
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the settlement agreement contained plain language that the Company’s value was 
to be determined in accordance with Alaska Statute 10.06.630(a).
305
 Thus, according to the court, 
the two appraisers’ valuations did not comply with the settlement agreement because liquidation 
costs should have been considered when determining this value.
306
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that appraisers must comply with appraisal provisions in a 
settlement agreements.
307
 
 
Charles v. Stout 
In Charles v. Stout,
308
 the supreme court held that a passenger is not an intended third party 
beneficiary of an insurance policy provided by a lender to protect the property that secures their 
loan.
309
 Charles was injured in a car accident where he was the passenger in Stout’s car.310 In 
addition to suing Stout, Charles also sued Credit Union 1, the lender and lienholder for the 
vehicle.
311
 The loan agreement between Credit Union 1 and Stout provided that Stout would 
maintain liability insurance but Credit Union 1 would have the right to obtain insurance if Stout 
failed to do so.
312
 The agreement further stated that any insurance procured by Credit Union 1 
would be primarily to protect Credit Union 1 rather than Stout.
313
 On appeal, Stout argued that he 
was an intended third party beneficiary of the insurance policy that Credit Union 1 contracted to 
provide and he is therefore entitled to recover under that policy.
314
 The supreme court affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that there was no written agreement compelling Credit 
Union 1 to provide liability coverage for the benefit of Stout.
315
 The court further reasoned that 
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there was no evidence Charles was an intended third party beneficiary of the aforementioned 
coverage.
316
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a passenger is not 
an intended third party beneficiary of an insurance policy provided by a lender to protect the 
property that secures their loan.
317
 
 
Fernandez v. Fernandez 
In Fernandez v. Fernandez,
318
 the supreme court held that, if so provided by the terms of a 
settlement agreement, parties can return to “square one” after being unable to, in good faith, 
fulfills the antecedent terms of the agreement.
319
 After David and Cynthia separated, they 
reached a settlement where Cynthia would pay David $33,000 through a second mortgage on her 
home.
320
 However, if Cynthia could not obtain the mortgage, the parties would negotiate an 
alternative payment plan in good faith; if no agreement resulted, they would return to “square 
one” and figure things out from that point.321 When this point was reached, the lower court 
imposed settlement terms upon Cynthia instead of allowing her to return to “square one.”322 On 
appeal, she argued the lower court had no authority to do that because the parties merely agreed 
to negotiate, not agree.
323
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
in an agreement to negotiate, parties retained the right to refuse proposed terms.
324
 In their 
settlement, Cynthia and David had not established a specific negotiation process, method of 
settling disputes or agreed a court could dictate settlement terms.
325
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that under the parties’ settlement agreement, a party could 
return to “square one” after being unable to, in good faith, fulfill the antecedent terms of the 
agreement.
326
 
 
Hussein-Scott v. Scott 
In Hussein-Scott v. Scott,
327
 the supreme court held that the more important or principal clause 
controls in determining the meaning of an ambiguous divorce settlement agreement.
328
 Jerry 
Scott and Camilla Hussein-Scott dissolved their marriage and the court adopted by reference a 
form settlement completed by Jerry and reviewed by Camilla.
329
 On the line supposedly 
designating the end date for spousal support payments, Jerry indicated that payment would end 
on December 2, 2020, which was the eighteenth birthday of the couple’s youngest daughter.330 
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On a subsequent line designated for other specifics, Jerry indicated that payment would end on 
the couple’s middle daughter’s birthday, which was August 1, 2015.331 The lower court reasoned 
that words should prevail over numbers and held that Jerry’s obligation to pay spousal support 
ended on the eighteenth birthday of the middle daughter.
332
 On appeal, Jerry argued that the 
lower court’s factual finding that he was less likely to make an error in writing a child’s name 
than in writing the date of a child’s birthday should be given deference.333 The supreme court 
reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the determination of the lower court was not 
factual and that the principle that words control over numbers did not apply here because it only 
applies to contracts that resemble commercial agreements.
334
 The court further reasoned that the 
written date was both more important because of its location on the form and because it appeared 
first on the form.
335
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the more 
important or principal clause controls in determining the meaning of an ambiguous divorce 
settlement agreement.
336
 
 
Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd. 
In Madonna v. Tamarack Air, Ltd.,
337
 the supreme court held that an airplane maintenance 
company does not have a contractual duty to repair a plane that was damaged on its airfield after 
completion of a routine maintenance inspection.
338
 Madonna brought his airplane to Tamarack 
Air, Ltd. (“Tamarack”) for a routine inspection, after which Tamarack damaged the plane while 
it sat on the company’s airfield.339 Offering to repair the plane, Tamarack estimated the costs 
with Madonna, who rejected their offer in favor of personally arranging the repairs.
340
 On appeal, 
Madonna challenged the lower court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing his claim that 
Tamarack had a contractual obligation to repair the damage it caused.
341
 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that since Madonna had brought his plane to 
Tamarack for maintenance, it only had a contractual duty to fix problems arising during the 
inspection.
342
 The inspection had been completed before the damaged occurred, so no such 
obligation to repair that damage existed.
343
 Furthermore, having rejected Tamarack’s repair offer, 
Madonna could not reasonably argue it had breached a duty to repair, unless he also conceded 
that Tamarack had to continually submit repair plans until he was satisfied, which would be an 
unenforceable contractual duty because of its indefinite and uncertain terms.
344
 Affirming the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an airplane maintenance company does not 
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have a contractual duty to repair an airplane that was damaged on its airfield after completion of 
a routine maintenance inspection.
345
 
 
Nautilus Marine Enters. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
In Nautilus Marine Enters. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
346
 the supreme court held that extrinsic 
evidence is admissible for interpreting the meaning of the words of a contract even when the 
language is not ambiguous.
347
 In 2006, Nautilus Marine and Exxon Mobil entered into a 
Settlement Agreement originating from a prior lawsuit.
348
 The parties, however, could not agree 
whether the prejudgment interest should be a simple or compound rate.
349
 Nautilus’ attorney 
subsequently suggested the parties settle the principal damages and allow the court to determine 
the proper prejudgment interest.
350
 The settlement agreement ultimately included language to the 
effect that interest would be “compounded annually.”351 Nevertheless, both parties agreed that 
there was no discussion about the meaning of “compounded annually.”352 On appeal, Nautilus 
argued that the parol evidence rule barred the court from considering extrinsic evidence for 
determining the meaning of the Settlement Agreement unless the language of the contract was 
ambiguous.
353
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the parol 
evidence rule only prohibited the enforcement of prior inconsistent agreements and that extrinsic 
evidence could be considered even when the language of the contract was not ambiguous.
354
 The 
court further reasoned that allowing for extrinsic evidence would allow the courts to better 
interpret the contract and, thus, better meet the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time 
the contract was formed.
355
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
extrinsic evidence is admissible for interpreting the meaning of the words of a contract even 
when the language is not ambiguous.
356
 
 
North Pacific Directors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Administration 
In North Pacific Directors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Administration,357 the supreme court held that a 
contractor is not entitled to additional compensation due to differing site conditions when the 
differing site conditions could have been noticed during contractor inspections.
358
 The Alaska 
Department of Administration (“Department”) and North Pacific contracted for a renovation, 
including asbestos removal, of the Juneau State Office Building.
359
 North Pacific’s contract 
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acknowledged that they were responsible for visiting and carefully examining the site.
360
 
Nevertheless, North Pacific did not visit the site before they began the contract’s work.361 Later, 
it requested additional compensation for the asbestos removal, claiming the site’s conditions 
differed from what was outlined in the contract, which caused the company to incur additional 
costs in fulfilling its obligations.
362
 The Department denied the differing site conditions claim.
363
 
North Pacific subsequently filed a claim against the Department, asserting that the Department 
had a duty to disclose superior knowledge of the site’s conditions.364 The supreme court affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, stating that no such duty existed.365 Therefore, according to the court, 
North Pacific’s claim must fail due to their failure to investigate the site.366 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that a contractor is not entitled to additional 
compensation due to differing site conditions when the differing site conditions could have been 
noticed during contractor inspections.
367
  
 
Weilbacher v. Ring 
In Weilbacher v. Ring,
368
 the supreme court held that contracts to transfer privilege are not 
unenforceable simply because a third party must approve the transfer before the transferee can 
enjoy the privilege’s benefits.369 Weilbacher brought action against Ring, a purchaser of one of 
his lots, seeking rescission of the sale based on a mutual mistake concerning which boat-tie ups 
were associated with each of his lots.
370
 As the right to some of the tie-ups in question had been 
subsequently re-sold to Berube, a third party whom Weilbacher had failed to join as a defendant, 
the court ordered Weilbacher to join Berube as an indispensable party.
371
 Weilbacher declined.
372
 
Asserting that Berube was necessary to provide relief to the parties, the lower court dismissed 
Weilbacher’s claim.373 On appeal, Weilbacher argued that because the failure to gain approval by 
the homeowner’s association had rendered the sales contract between him and Ring meaningless, 
Berube was not an indispensable party because Weilbacher had no claim against him.
374
 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that many types of privilege are 
subject to approval by third parties prior to sale.
375
 Nevertheless, according to the court, the 
initial sales contract here memorializing the privilege transfers were no less enforceable just 
because public agency approval was required before the parties could receive the full benefits of 
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their contractual obligations.
376
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
contracts to transfer privilege are not unenforceable simply because a third party must approve 
the transfer.
377
 
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Top   
 
Bottcher v. State 
In Bottcher v. State,
378
 the supreme court held a person does not need to be a chronic offender for 
a lifetime revocation of their driver’s license to be proper.379 While intoxicated, Bottcher drove 
his vehicle off of the road, killing a thirteen year-old boy and just nearly missing his nine year-
old brother.
380
 Bottcher was stopped by a witness to the accident but refused to return to the 
scene, deciding to drive in the opposite direction instead.
381
 Following his subsequent arrest, it 
was determined that Bottcher had a blood-alcohol content of 0.237 at the time.
382
 Among other 
punishments, the lower court ultimately revoked Bottcher’s driver’s license for life.383 On 
appeal, Bottcher argued that this lifetime revocation was excessive.
384
 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that it was the court’s duty to determine whether 
the case at hand represented an extreme one where lifetime revocation was necessary to protect 
the public.
385
 Here, according to the court, the lower court was not clearly mistaken in 
determining that Bottcher’s driver’s license must be revoked for life to protect the public 
considering his current offense in conjunction with his long history of alcohol abuse.
386
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held a person does not need to be a 
chronic offender for a lifetime revocation of their driver’s license to be proper.387 
 
Diorec v. State 
In Diorec v. State,
388
 the court of appeals held that a probation condition must give 
constitutionally adequate notice of what is prohibited.
389
 Diorec was charged with and plead no 
contest to unlawful sexual exploitation of a minor for possessing tapes of his stepdaughter in 
various stages of undress.
390
 The lower court imposed several probation conditions on Diorec, 
                                                 
376
 Id.  
377
 Id.  
378
 300 P.3d 528 (Alaska 2013). 
379
 Id. at 533. 
380
 Id. at 529. 
381
 Id. 
382
 Id. 
383
 Id.  
384
 Id. 
385
 Id. at 533. 
386
 Id. at 534–35. 
387
 Id. at 533. 
388
 295 P.3d 409 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013). 
389
 Id. at 412. 
390
 Id. 
including a prohibition on possessing sexually explicit material.
391
 On appeal, Diorec argued that 
prohibiting sexually explicit material possession was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague 
because it might restrict possession of sexually explicit adult material.
392
 The court of appeals 
remanded the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Diorec’s probation condition failed to give 
Diorec adequate notice of what was actually prohibited.
393
 Thus, according to the court, since 
“sexually explicit material” was defined to include “pornography,” a term that had been held to 
be unconstitutionally vague, the probation condition was unconstitutionally vague as well.
394
 
Remanding the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a probation condition must 
give constitutionally adequate notice of what is prohibited.
395
 
 
Flood v. State 
In Flood v. State,
396
 the court of appeals held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right 
to waive his presence at trial.
397
 At trial, the judge denied Flood’s request to be absent at his 
trial.
398
 On appeal, Flood argued the trial judge abused his discretion in denying this request.
399
 
Flood reasoned that because a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at his trial, he 
must also have a right to waive this constitutional right.
400
 The court of appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that a constitutional right is a positive grant insofar as it does 
not inherently provide a defendant with the opposite of that right.
401
 Thus, having the right to be 
present at trial did not give Flood a constitutional right to waive his presence at trial.
402
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that there was no abuse of 
discretion since a defendant does not have a constitutional right to waive his presence at trial.
403
  
 
George v. State 
In George v. State,
404
 the court of appeals held that probationers are not awarded good time 
credit to for spending time at a halfway house under a condition of probation.
405
 George and 
Price were sentenced to various periods of probation as part of their convictions.
406
 On probation, 
both George and Price spent time at Glacier Manor, a halfway house.
407
 Subsequently, both 
violated their probations multiple times, had their probations revoked by the lower court and 
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were ordered to serve the remainder of their sentences in jail.
408
 On appeal, George and Price 
argued that they should receive good time credit for their time spent at Glacier Manor.
409
 The 
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the governing statute, by its 
very terms, only applied to prisoners spending time at a correctional facility.
410
 In addition, the 
court found that, as a matter of policy, that prisoners and probationers have different incentives 
for good behavior and that the application of good time credit is the prisoner’s, not probationer’s, 
incentive for good behavior.
411
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held 
that probationers are not awarded good time credit to for spending time at a halfway house under 
a condition of probation.
412
 
 
Jarnig v. State 
In Jarnig v. State,
413
 the court of appeals held that a warrantless search of a closed container is 
invalid unless the container is both “immediately associated with the arrest and within the 
person’s immediate control at the time of arrest.”414 In, 2006 the Anchorage police arrested 
Jarnig, the driver of a car they believed to have been stolen.
415
 While Jarnig was in a patrol car 
following his arrest, an officer searched the alleged stolen car and found a black nylon bag 
wedged under the passenger’s seat that contained drugs and drug paraphernalia.416 Subsequently, 
Jarnig was charged with third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.
417
 The lower 
court convicted Jarnig, holding that the police had the authority to search any container that was 
within the driver’s reach at the time of the arrest.418 On appeal, Jarnig argued that the search of 
the bag was illegal.
419
 The court of appeals remanded the case back to the lower court, reasoning 
that the search was invalid because a warrantless search of a closed container will only be upheld 
as a search incident to arrest if the container was both within the person's immediate control at 
the time of arrest and immediately associated with that person.
420
 Thus, the lower court’s 
analysis was incomplete.
421
 Remanding the case back to the lower court, the court of appeals 
held that a warrantless search of a closed container is invalid unless the container is both 
“immediately associated with the arrest and within the person’s immediate control at the time of 
arrest.”422 
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Joseph v. State 
In Joseph v. State,
423
 the court of appeals held that mitigating factor (d)(9) under the state’s 
presumptive sentencing regime is applicable to sentencing for perjury.
424
 Following a trial for a 
speeding ticket, the defendant was charged with perjury.
425
 A presumptive sentencing range 
applied to the defendant because she was a second felony offender.
426
 At trial, the defendant 
proposed mitigating factor (d)(9) among others.
427
 Mitigating factor (d)(9) requires sentencing 
mitigation where the conduct in question is among the least serious within the defined offense.
428
 
The lower court reasoned that (d)(9) was inapplicable to sentencing for perjury because its 
classification as a class B felony indicated the legislature’s decision that perjury was a serious 
offense.
429
 On appeal, the defendant argued that the ruling on (d)(9) was made in error.
430
 The 
court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning while the designation as a class B 
felony was evidence of the legislature’s decision that perjury was a serious offense, accepting the 
lower court’ reasoning would result in every class B felony falling outside the scope of (d)(9).431 
However, according to the court, factor (d)(9)’s function remained consistent across all offenses, 
serious or not.
432
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that mitigating 
factor (d)(9) under the state’s presumptive sentencing regime is applicable to sentencing for 
perjury.
433
 
 
Knipe v. State 
In Knipe v. State,
434
 the court of appeals held that, when the totality of the circumstances is 
properly weighed, it is not inappropriate to not refer sentencing to a statewide three-judge 
panel.
435
 Knipe pled guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree but requested that the 
issue of sentencing be referred to a statewide three-judge panel because he believed the 
presumptive sentence would be manifestly unjust as applied to him.
436
 The lower court denied 
this request.
437
 On appeal, Knipe argued that denial of his request for referral to the statewide 
three-judge panel was manifestly unjust because of his low cognitive abilities and his childhood 
history of sexual abuse and neglect.
438
 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the superior court appropriately focused their denial of Knipe’s request on the 
totality of the circumstances, including the severity of the injury to the victim and Knipe’s failure 
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to provide an assessment of his rehabilitation potential or recidivism risk.
439
 The court further 
reasoned that although Knipe’s cognitive ability and history of abuse presented legitimate 
factors, the lower court’s decision not to refer sentencing to the statewide three-judge panel was 
not clearly mistaken.
440
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that, 
when the totality of the circumstances is properly weighed, it is not inappropriate to not refer 
sentencing to a statewide three-judge panel.
441
 
 
Lewis v. State 
In Lewis v. State,
442
 the court of appeals held that walking away from a halfway house in a non-
violent and temporary manner could constitute a mitigating factor for the offense of escape in the 
second degree.
443
 In 2010, Lewis was placed in Glenwood Center, a halfway house in 
Anchorage.
444
 Shortly after his arrival, Lewis, drunk at the time, wandered away from the house 
despite being told that he should not leave.
445
 Within twenty-four hours, Lewis called the police 
and turned himself in, claiming that his leaving was a big misunderstanding.
446
 Nevertheless, at 
his sentencing, the lower court refused to mitigate his sentence even though his escape was both 
temporary and nonviolent.
447
 On appeal, Lewis argued that the lower court erred in refusing to 
mitigate his sentence.
448
 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding the 
nature of his escape both nonviolent and temporary enough to warrant a mitigation of his 
sentence.
449
 The court reasoned that such mitigation was proper because Lewis’ escape “was 
among the least serious included in the offense” for which he was convicted.450 Reversing the 
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that walking away from a halfway house in a 
non-violent and temporary manner could constitute a mitigating factor for the offense of escape 
in the second degree.
451
 
 
Luckart v. State 
In Luckart v. State,
452
 the supreme court held that when a defendant’s sentencing is referred to a 
three judge panel because it has been determined that the presumptive sentence would be 
manifestly unjust, the panel has authority to expand the prisoner’s parole eligibility.453 After 
determining that sentencing Luckart within the presumptive range would be manifestly unjust, 
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the lower court referred Luckart’s case to a three-judge panel for sentencing.454 Although it 
sentenced him below the presumptive range, the panel determined it did not have authority to 
enhance Luckart’s parole eligibility.455 On appeal, Luckart argued that the panel did have such 
authority.
456
 The supreme court reversed the panel’s decision, reasoning that a sentence’s 
presumptive nature alone was not determinative of the panel’s authority to enhance parole 
eligibility.
457
 The court further stated that when the panel is referred a case governed by 
presumptive sentencing guidelines, the panel has the authority to enhance parole eligibility 
unless limited by a specific statutory provision.
458
 Reversing the panel’s decision, the supreme 
court held that the three judge sentencing panel has authority to grant enhanced parole eligibility 
to defendants subject to presumptive sentences.
459
 
 
Martin v. State 
In Martin v. State,
460
 the court of appeals held that police may obtain evidence upon which to 
base a search warrant by walking up to a residence and peering inside through a small break in a 
closed set of blinds.
461
 After tailing a group of individuals who had just purchased some 
materials often used in the production of methamphetamine, a police officer approached the 
apartment the group had just entered by way of a shared deck.
462
 Upon reaching the window, the 
officer observed a small crack in the closed blinds and looked into the residence where he saw 
items used for making methamphetamine.
463
 The officer obtained a search warrant by telephone 
and then proceeded to arrest Martin and search the apartment.
464
 On appeal, Martin argued that 
the officer’s search was unconstitutionally unreasonable.465 The court of appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that although the closed blinds likely indicated both a desire for 
as well as a reasonable subjective belief of privacy, the weight of authority permitted the 
government to peer through such a hole.
466
 Thus, because the officer was able to peer through the 
hole with physical ease from a public vantage point, and was not conducting a mere fishing 
expedition, his search was lawful and not unreasonable.
467
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the court of appeals held that police may obtain evidence upon which to base a search warrant by 
walking up to a residence and peering inside through a small break in a closed set of blinds.
468
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Rofkar v. State 
In Rofkar v. State,
469
 the court of appeals held that a charge for possessing or manufacturing 
marijuana should be merged with a conviction for maintaining a building for keeping their 
controlled substances under Alaska’s Double Jeopardy Clause.470 In the lower court, Rofkar was 
convicted of three counts relating to the possession and manufacturing of marijuana and a fourth 
count relating to the maintenance of a building for keeping or distributing controlled substances.
 
471
 The lower court merged the first three charges into a single conviction but refused to merge 
the fourth charge with the other three.
472
 On appeal, Rofkar argued that Alaska’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause requires the fourth charge be merged with the other three.
473
 The court of 
appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the statute criminalizing the 
maintaining of a building for keeping controlled substances was aimed at persons who facilitate 
someone else’s drug offenses rather than at the person committing the drug offenses.474 Thus, if a 
person both commits the underlying drug offenses in addition to maintaining a building for 
keeping their controlled substances, the charges must be merged.
475
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that a charge for possessing or manufacturing marijuana must 
be merged with a conviction for maintaining a building for keeping their controlled substances 
under Alaska’s Double Jeopardy Clause.476 
 
State v. Korkow 
In State v. Korkow,
477
 the supreme court held that there is no legal presumption against a parole 
restriction beyond the statutory minimum.
478
 Korkow was convicted of first-degree murder after 
stabbing his wife to death in front of his two young children.
479
 The sentencing judge, after 
considering the severity of the case and Korkow’s lack of remorse, restricted Korkow’s 
eligibility for discretionary parole beyond the 33-year statutory minimum to 50 years, noting the 
need to protect Korkow’s children and the public at large.480 On appeal, Korkow argued that 
parole restriction was outside of the permissible range compared with other cases.
481
 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that although sentencing courts 
may take into consideration the Parole Board’s expertise in assessing an individual’s likelihood 
for a successful parole, sentencing courts are expressly permitted to restrict eligibility for 
discretionary parole beyond the minimum.
482
 Here, the restriction was proper because the lower 
court had adequately considered all enumerated criteria, including the severity of the crime, 
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Korkow’s lack of remorse and the need to protect the public.483 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that there is no legal presumption against a parole restriction 
beyond the statutory minimum.
484
 
 
State v. Silvera 
In State v. Silvera,
485
 the court of appeals held that federal law does not preempt a three-judge 
sentencing panel’s authority to impose a sentence lower than the presumptive range after 
considering the “harsh collateral consequences” of deportation.486 After reviewing Silvera’s case, 
a three-judge sentencing panel considered the non-statutory mitigating factor of deportation’s 
“harsh collateral consequences” on a criminal defendant and imposed a sentence under the 
presumptive range since deportation would subject Silvera to those “harsh collateral 
consequences.”487 On appeal, the State argued that federal law prohibited a panel from 
modifying Silvera’s sentence to affect immigration consequences.488 The court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Congress only prohibited state courts from 
deciding whether a criminal defendant should be deported.
489
 Congress, according to the court, 
did not expressly forbid state courts from adjusting a defendant’s sentence to lessen the risk of 
deportation.
490
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that federal law 
does not preempt a three-judge sentencing panel’s authority to consider the “harsh collateral 
consequences” of deportation and impose a sentence lower than the presumptive range.491 
 
Stepovich v. State 
In Stepovich v. State,
492
 the supreme court held that merely attempting to hide evidence is not 
sufficient to support a conviction for attempted evidence tampering.
493
 Stepovich and another 
man were standing in an alley behind a bar with their hands cupped leaning towards each 
other.
494
 Both men were looking down into their hands when the arresting officer spotted 
them.
495
 As the officer approached the men, Stepovich backed away behind a dumpster.
496
 He 
reappeared empty handed.
497
 Subsequently, the officer found a small envelope of cocaine lying 
behind the dumpster.
498
 Stepovich was accordingly found guilty of attempted evidence 
tampering.
499
 On appeal, Stepovich argued that his conduct was not sufficient to support a 
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conviction for attempted evidence tampering.
500
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that if a broad reading of suppressing and concealing were accepted it would 
unduly raise many misdemeanor cases when evidence was dropped or thrown into felony 
evidence tampering convictions.
501
 Therefore, according to the court, the test here was whether 
the defendant’s actions made it impossible or substantially more difficult for the evidence to be 
recovered.
502
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that merely 
attempting to hide evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction attempted evidence 
tampering.
503
 
 
Welsh v. State 
In Welsh v. State,
504
 the court of appeals held that restitution in criminal cases is limited to the 
amount of actual damages that result rather than the amount of the defendant’s unjust gain.505 
Welsh was convicted of third-degree theft after stealing medication from the clinic where she 
was employed.
506
 The pills she stole were purchased by the clinic for three cents each and sold 
retail for seventy-six cents each.
507
 The lower court required Welsh to pay the seventy-six cents 
price in restitution based on an unjust enrichment theory.
508
 On appeal, Welsh argued that it was 
improper to award damages on such a theory in the case.
509
 The court of appeals reversed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the proper measure of restitution is the amount of actual 
damages suffered.
510
 The court further reasoned, however, this amount does not need to be 
limited to wholesale prices, as that amount might not be sufficient to wholly cover the actual 
damages suffered.
511
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that 
restitution in criminal cases is limited to the actual amount of damages suffered.
512
 
 
Williams v. State 
In Williams v. State,
513
 the court of appeals held that parole, even if subject to restrictive 
conditions, is not “official detention.”514 Williams, having been convicted of a felony, was 
ordered to live at a community residential center (“CRC”) as a condition of his parole.515 While 
being transported from one CRC to another, Williams left the transporting van as well as the 
surrounding area.
516
 Based on these actions, Williams was convicted of escape in the second 
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degree, which was defined as removing oneself from official detention resulting from a felony 
without lawful authority.
517
 On appeal, the State argued that “official detention” included parole 
with restrictive conditions such as the ones here.
518
 The court of appeals reversed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that the legislative history of the statutory defined “official detention” 
such that the legislature did not intend the term to include supervision on probation or parole.
519
 
Accordingly, Williams could not be convicted of escape in the second degree because he was not 
subject to official detention.
520
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held 
that parole, even if subject to restrictive conditions, is not “official detention.”521 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Top   
 
Angasan v. State 
In Angasan v. State,
522
 the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a new trial based on 
evidence not presented at trial must normally show that this evidence was not known and could 
not have been known through diligent inquiry at the time of trial.
523
 Angasan filed a motion 
seeking a new trial, claiming that he had new evidence that would exculpate him from his 
conviction.
524
 The evidence consisted of affidavits from four of his relatives.
525
 The lower court 
denied Angasan’s motion, finding that the affidavits were known to either Angasan or his 
attorney at the time of trial and thus did not qualify as newly discovered evidence.
526
 On appeal, 
Angasan argued that he was entitled to a new trial based on any such evidence not presented at 
trial, even if it was known to the defendant or could have been known with diligent inquiry.
527
 
The supreme affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that almost every American 
jurisdiction required the new evidence to be unknown and not knowable through diligent inquiry 
at the time of trial before granting a new trial.
528
 The court further reasoned that such a 
requirement was necessary to prevent defendants from obtaining a new trial after receiving an 
adverse result and realizing that a different strategy might have been more effective.
529
 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a new trial based on 
evidence not presented at trial must normally show that this evidence was not known and could 
not have been known through diligent inquiry at the time of trial.
530
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Fisher v. State 
In Fisher v. State,
531
 the supreme court held that when a defendant files a habeas petition that 
could be filed under Criminal Rule 35.1, the court must treat the complaint as an application for 
post-conviction relief under that rule.
532
 Fisher filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, raising 
issues that could have been pursued in an application for post-conviction relief under Criminal 
Rule 35.1.
533
 The lower court dismissed his petition, and later denied his motion for 
reconsideration, holding that courts have the discretion to dismiss such claims and direct the 
defendant to file a new application for post-conviction relief.
534
 On appeal, Fisher argued that 
Civil Rule 86(m) requires the superior court to convert his petition into an application for post-
conviction relief.
535
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that courts 
have never been given the discretion to dismiss habeas complaints that could be treated as 
applications for post-conviction relief.
536
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that when a defendant files a habeas petition that could be filed under Criminal Rule 35.1, 
the court must treat the complaint as an application for post-conviction relief under that rule.
537
 
 
Davison v. State 
In Davison v. State,
538
 the court of appeals held that when a defendant disputes factual 
allegations in a presentence report, the sentencing court must determine the validity and 
relevance of those allegations.
539
 Davison was initially charged with sexually assaulting his 
daughter based on penile, oral and digital penetration.
540
 On appeal, Davidson argued that 
statements regarding the alleged oral and digital penetration, charges he was acquitted of, should 
be stricken from the presentence report.
541
 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that the importance of presentence reports and the degree to which they can 
affect a defendant in future necessitated action to determine whether any disputed facts contained 
in the report are sufficiently verified.
542
 Thus, if such facts are found to be untrue, lacking in 
verification or will not be considered, the court must remove those assertions from the report.
543
 
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that when a defendant disputes 
factual allegations in a presentence report, the sentencing court must determine the validity and 
relevance of those allegations.
544
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Hertz v. Macomber 
In Hertz v. Macomber,
545
 the supreme court held that the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) 
may impose furlough release conditions regardless of whether those conditions were part of an 
inmate’s original sentence.546 In 1984, Hertz was convicted of second-degree murder and 
sentenced to a 40-year term with a 20-year parol eligibility.
547
 In 2009, he applied for an early 
release furlough but was denied because he refused to sign the paper work that required 
treatment or community service as conditions to his furlough.
548
 Hertz subsequently filed a 
complaint against his parol officers arguing that they lacked authority to impose furlough release 
conditions because they were not part of his original sentence and, accordingly, violated his due 
process rights.
549
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that such 
conditions did not prolong Hertz’s sentence.550 Thus, according to the court, the conditions did 
not implicate a liberty interest and, consequently, did not violate Hertz’s due process rights.551 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the DOC may impose furlough 
release conditions regardless of whether those conditions were part of an inmate’s original 
sentence.
552
 
 
Hunter v. State 
In Hunter v. State,
553
 the court of appeals held that a detective cannot testify to a defendant’s 
reputation based solely on interviews with and reports by other law enforcement officers.
554
 
Hunter was convicted for second-degree murder based in part on the testimony of Detective 
Perrenoud.
555
 Perrenoud testified that Hunter had a reputation in the community for aggression 
and violence.
556
 This testimony was based entirely on an investigation involving interviews with 
law enforcement officers and reviews of documents prepared by law enforcement officers.
557
 On 
appeal, the State argued that the law enforcement officers were members of the community and 
therefore that Hunter’s reputation amongst them was his reputation within the community.558 The 
court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Hunter’s testified-to 
reputation existed only in a particular group of the community and, accordingly, was not 
necessarily generally held.
559
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that 
a detective cannot testify to a defendant’s reputation based solely on interviews with and reports 
by other law enforcement officers.
560
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Hutton v. State 
In Hutton v. State,
561
 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury with 
regards to a special interrogatory is protected when the jury receives a general instruction that 
each verdict must be unanimous.
562
 Hutton was charged with third-degree misconduct involving 
weapons, which required the jury find that he knowingly possessed a concealable firearm.
563
 To 
avoid prejudice with regards to the other charges against Hutton, this question was presented to 
the jury as a special interrogatory.
564
 Because the interrogatory did not contain the phrase “We, 
the jury,” as the other counts began, Hutton argued on appeal that there was a significant 
possibility that the jury did not understand its decision needed to be unanimous.
565
 The court of 
appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that, because the special interrogatory was 
presented along with jury instructions stating that each verdict must be unanimous, the jury 
probably viewed the unanimity requirement as applying to the special interrogatory.
566
 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury 
with regards to a special interrogatory is protected when the jury receives a general instruction 
that each verdict must be unanimous.
567
 
 
Miller v. State 
In Miller v. State,
568
 the court of appeals held that failing to make an express ruling in connection 
with sentencing is not harmless error where the record does not clearly establish the truth of the 
allegation at issue.
569
 Miller was charged with assault for attacking a woman with whom he had a 
previous sexual encounter.
570
 At trial, the State alleged that the assault charge was a crime of 
domestic violence, which carried a mandatory sentence of thirty days in prison.
571
 Without ever 
expressly ruling whether Miller’s crime was a domestic violence, the lower court issued its 
written judgment labeling it as such.
572
 On appeal, the State argued that the court’s error was 
harmless.
573
 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, stating that the court was 
required to make a factual and legal determination supporting its characterization of the offense 
on the record.
574
 Here, the record did not affirmatively establish that Miller’s conduct constituted 
a crime of domestic violence.
575
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held 
that failing to make an express ruling in connection with sentencing is not harmless error where 
the record does not clearly establish the truth of the allegation at issue.
576
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 State v. Clifton 
In State v. Clifton,
577
 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal defendant could be 
subject to a second and separate trial to assess if the defendant was guilty but mentally ill.
578
 
Clifton believed she was under covert government surveillance.
579
 In 2006, Clifton and her 
human resources manager had a meeting where Clifton was informed she would have to undergo 
psychiatric evaluation.
580
 In response to this news, Clifton shoved the barrel of a loaded pistol 
against the manager’s ribs and pulled the trigger.581 While the pistol failed to fire, Clifton was 
still indicted for attempted murder and third-degree assault.
582
 Multiple psychologists determined 
that Clifton suffered from a delusional disorder, but Clifton’s attorney stated that he did not 
intend to rely on an insanity defense.
583
 Clifton was later found guilty on both counts and the 
State filed a motion asking the lower court to determine if Clifton should be found “guilty but 
mentally ill.”584 The lower court stated that ruling her as “guilty but mentally ill” after her trial 
would be an unconstitutional violation of her equal protection rights.
585
 On appeal, Clifton 
argued that the legislature’s distinction between defendants who commit crimes and defendants 
who commit crimes who also suffer from a mental disease was arbitrary.
586
 The court of appeals 
reversed the lower court’s decision, stating that it was constitutional for the state to have lawfully 
enacted the procedures.
587
 The court reasoned that the legislature, in drawing the aforementioned 
distinction, could have found that the latter types of defendants should have their parole 
restricted because of their inability to appreciate the crimes they committed.
588
 Reversing the 
lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal defendant could be 
subject to a second and separate trial to assess if the defendant was guilty but mentally ill.
589
  
 
White v. State 
In White v. State,
590
 the court of appeals held that a trial court may only grant a motion to 
overturn the jury’s verdict and order a new trial when the judge finds the evidence to be so one-
sided that the jury’s view of the case was plainly unreasonable and unjust.591 In the trial court, a 
jury found White guilty of fourth-degree assault.
592
 After the verdict, White motioned under 
Alaska Criminal Rule 33(a) for the judge to overturn the jury’s verdict and order a new trial on 
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the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
593
 The judge denied the 
motion because the jury’s verdict should not be overturned if there was any evidentiary basis for 
the jury’s decision.594 On appeal, White argued that the district court erred by using the “any 
evidentiary basis” test when deciding his motion for a new trial.595 The court of appeals reversed 
the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the only legal test appropriate in a trial court for a 
motion for a new trial is the “plainly unreasonable and unjust” test.596 The court further reasoned 
that the “any evidentiary basis” test is the proper standard only when an appellate court reviews a 
trial court’s denial of a request for a new trial.597 Reversing the trial court’s decision, the court of 
appeals held that a trial court may only grant a motion to overturn the jury’s verdict and order a 
new trial when the judge finds the evidence to be so one-sided that the jury’s view of the case 
was plainly unreasonable and unjust.
598
 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Top   
 
ARCTEC Services v. Cummings 
In ARCTEC Services v. Cummings,
599
 the supreme court held that witness-credibility 
determinations by the Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) are made in accordance with 
a subjective standard.
600
 In 2006, Cummings was hurt on the job and began receiving workers' 
compensation checks that periodically required her to certify that she had not been working.
601
 
However, while receiving the checks, Cummings occasionally worked without pay in her 
boyfriend's store.
602
 In 2008, ARCTEC filed a petition for a finding of fraud with the Board.
603
 
Since the Board found Cummings’ testimony that she considered her time at the store to be 
purely voluntary and therefore not necessary to report credible, it denied ARCTEC’s petition.604 
ARCTEC subsequently appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (the 
“Commission”), arguing that the Board should have used an objective standard to evaluate 
Cummings' testimony that would determine if Cummings’ subjectively held belief was 
objectively reasonable.
605
 The Commission agreed that the Board should have used an objective 
standard.
606
 The supreme court reversed the Commission’s decision, citing evidence that both the 
legislative history and the language of the statute itself called for a subjective standard.
607
 The 
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court further reasoned that since the legislature had given the Board "the sole power to determine 
credibility of a witness," the objective standard would also impermissibly impinge on the Board's 
authority.
608
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that witness-credibility 
determinations by the Board are made in accordance with a subjective standard.
609
 
 
Beach v. Handforth-Kome 
In Beach v. Handforth-Kome,
610
 the supreme court held once an employer discovers reasonable 
grounds for dismissal, the employer need not provide additional procedural protections.
611
 Beach 
was fired from her job at a health clinic when the clinic’s director discovered that she had 
falsified prescription drug records.
612
 Beach sued, alleging a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith since she believed her employer retaliated against her for her suggestions about 
improving clinic security.
613
 On appeal, Beach argued that her termination was not objectively 
fair.
614
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Handforth-Kome 
had conducted a methodical review of the records that showed that the records were falsified and 
that Beach was responsible for the aforementioned falsification.
615
 Accordingly, since the 
methodical review uncovered reasonable grounds for dismissal, according to the court, additional 
procedural protection was unnecessary.
616
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held once an employer discovers reasonable grounds for dismissal, the employer need not 
provide additional procedural protections.
617
 Beach was fired from her job at a health clinic when 
the clinic’s director discovered that she had falsified prescription drug records.618 
 
Grimmett v. University of Alaska 
In Grimmett v. University of Alaska,
619
 the supreme court held that an employer generally may 
not avoid a for-cause employee’s due process protections at termination through use of a 
nonretention clause.
620
 In 2008, two employees of the University of Alaska lost their 
employment due to performance concerns.
621
 Despite the for-cause language in their 
employment contracts, both employees were denied termination-for-cause hearings based upon 
the nonretention clause in their contracts.
622
 On appeal, the University of Alaska argued that the 
nonretention clause allowed the University to terminate non-tenured employees without a 
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showing of cause.
623
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that using 
nonretention as a pretext for performance related termination violates an employee’s expectation 
of due process under a for-cause contract.
624
 The court further reasoned that under the 
University’s regulations, nonretention was only available when market forces, lack of funds, 
reorganization or other nonperformance issues called for the discontinuation of employment.
625
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an employer generally may not 
avoid a for-cause employee’s due process protections by use of a nonretention clause in 
terminating employment.
626
 
 
Johnson v. Aleut Corp. 
In Johnson v. Aleut Corp,
 627
 the supreme court held that a broadly worded arbitration agreement 
can give an arbitrator authority to determine the arbitrability of disputes as well as resolve such 
disputes based on theories that differ from those submitted by the parties.
628
 The employment 
contract between the Aleut Corporation (the “Corporation”) and Johnson stated that Johnson 
would serve as CEO of the Corporation with an automatic extension subject to both his fulfilling 
a reminder provision and the Corporation providing him with notice if it chose not to renew his 
employment.
629
 Even though the Corporation never received Johnson’s reminder, the two parties 
nonetheless proceeded to engage in renewal discussions.
630
 After Johnson was subsequently 
terminated without requisite notice, he challenged his termination in arbitration as required by 
his employment agreement. 
631
 The arbitrator ultimately determined that because the Corporation 
was aware of the reminder provision and because it did not terminate Johnson for cause, it 
breached the contract.
632
 The lower court subsequently vacated the decision, holding that the 
arbitrator acted beyond the scope of his authority in determining that, contrary to both parties’ 
concessions, the reminder was not a condition precedent to the renewal of Johnson’s contract.633 
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that great deference is given to 
arbitration decisions.
634
 Thus, according to the court, the arbitrator’s conclusion that the 
Corporation violated the agreement was reasonable and within the scope of the arbitrator’s 
authority.
635
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a broadly worded 
arbitration agreement can give an arbitrator authority to determine the arbitrability of disputes as 
well as resolve such disputes based on theories that differ from those submitted by the parties.
636
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Mills v. Hankla 
In Mills v. Hankla,
637
 the supreme court held that municipalities are immune from negligent 
hiring claims because hiring is a discretionary action requiring deliberation and judgment.
638
 
Hankla did not meet the eligibility requirements when he was appointed Hoonah police chief by 
the Hoonah City Council (the “Council”).639 The Council subsequently amended the city code to 
make him qualified and rehired him.
640
 Four employees then claimed the city negligently hired 
Hankla because of his alleged discriminatory treatment and sexual harassment.
641
 On appeal, the 
employees challenged the lower court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing their negligent 
hiring claim.
642
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, interpreting Alaska 
Statute 09.65.070(d)(2) as providing qualified official immunity protecting municipalities from 
liability for discretionary actions when those actions were done by a public official within his 
scope of duties.
643
 Here, according to the court, the Council’s appointment of Hankla was 
discretionary because it required deliberation and judgment in evaluating and selecting 
candidates from an applicant pool.
644
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that municipalities are immune from negligent hiring claims because hiring is a 
discretionary action requiring deliberation and judgment.
645
 
 
Morrison v. Nana Worleyparsons, LLC 
In Morrison v. Nana Worleyparsons, LLC,
646
 the supreme court held that short-term performance 
plans, without express indications to the contrary, do not alter at-will employment contracts.
647
 
Morrison, an at-will employee at Nana Worleyparsons, was placed onto a Performance 
Improvement Plan (“PIP”) aimed at improving his lackluster work performance and negative 
attitude.
648
 Shortly thereafter, Morrison made an inappropriate comment to a co-worker at a work 
party and was fired.
649
 On appeal, Morrison argued that Nana Worleyparsons both breached his 
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
650
 The supreme court affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that since the PIP did not contain any express indications 
changing the at-will nature of Morrison’s employment, the PIP did not alter his original at-will 
employment contract.
651
 The court further reasoned Nana Worleyparson’s actions did not breach 
the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing because their actions were both objectively 
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and subjectively appropriate in Morrison’s particular circumstance.652 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that short-term performance plans, without express 
indications to the contrary, do not alter at-will employment contracts.
653
 
 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson 
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Adamson,
654
 the supreme court held that in order to stay future 
medical benefits, an employer must demonstrate “the existence of the probability” that an appeal 
of a workers’ compensation decision will be decided against the compensation recipient.655 This 
case consolidated two lower court cases.
656
 In one case, the Municipality of Anchorage appealed 
an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) decision awarding compensation, 
arguing that medical benefits should be stayed under the standard of “probability of success on 
the merits.”657 The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (the “Commission”) 
subsequently refused the stay because the Municipality had not shown that it was more likely 
than not that the appeal would prevail on the merits.
658
 In the other case, the City and Borough of 
Juneau (“CBJ”) similarly appealed a Board decision, asking for a stay of future medical benefits 
under the standard that it was more likely than not that the merits of the appeal would be decided 
in CBJ’s favor.659 The Commission applied a substantial question standard and, finding that CBJ 
raised a “serious and substantial question” about the claim, granted the stay.660 The supreme 
court affirmed the “probability of success on the merits” standard, reasoning that the correct 
standard must balance the hardships likely faced by both the employer and the employee in these 
types of cases.
661
 Thus, according to the court, this high threshold was necessary since medical 
benefits were ongoing benefits that acted as a salary substitute for injured employees.
662
 
Reviewing the two consolidated cases, the supreme court held that in order to stay future medical 
benefits, an employer must demonstrate “the existence of the probability” that an appeal of a 
workers’ compensation decision will be decided against the compensation recipient.663  
 
Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 v. Municipality of Anchorage,
664
 the supreme court held 
that the Anchorage Municipal Code (“AMC”) limits the equitable jurisdiction of courts with 
respect to collective bargaining disputes.
665
 The Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 367 (“Union”) 
and the Municipality of Anchorage (“Anchorage”) were engaged in collective bargaining 
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negotiations for over a year.
666
 Unable to reach an agreement on all key points, the Union and 
Anchorage submitted Last Best Offers (“LBO”) to an arbitrator as required by the AMC.667 The 
arbitrator adopted the Union’s LBO, but, subsequently, the Anchorage Assembly failed to 
approve the decision.
668
 The Union voted to strike but in the interest of public health and safety 
forewent executing that action for the time being.
669
 On appeal, the Union argued that the 
arbitrator’s decision should be implemented in return for issuing an injunction against a strike 
pursuant to the court’s equitable jurisdiction.670 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that, even acting in equity, a court cannot disregard statutes that “plain and 
fully” cover a situation.671 Thus, according to the court, the court’s equitable power to grant 
relief that must be found within the AMC’s comprehensive scheme regulating impasses such as 
here was absent.
672
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the AMC 
limits the equitable jurisdiction of courts with respect to collective bargaining disputes.
673
 
 
Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care 
In Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care,
674
 the supreme court held that filing an affidavit for 
readiness for hearing nearly four years after an employer files a controversion of such claim does 
not substantially comply with the two-year statute of limitations imposed by the workers’ 
compensation statute.
675
 In 2004, Pruitt was injured on the job and began receiving disability 
benefits.
676
 In 2005, after Pruitt filed a workers’ compensation claim, Pruitt’s employer, 
Providence Extended Care (“Providence”), filed three separate controversions in an attempt to 
disclaim any future disability payments.
677
 In 2009, Pruitt filed an affidavit for readiness for 
hearing and a hearing was held by the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”). Providence 
argued, and the Board agreed, that Pruitt’s claim should be dismissed as she failed to file 
anything within the two-year statute of limitations period, which began to run in 2005.
678
 The 
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (“Commission”) subsequently upheld the 
Board’s decision and Pruitt appealed to the supreme court.679 The supreme court affirmed the 
Commission’s decision, reasoning that the plain language of the statute, along with the Board’s 
urging in 2006 that Pruitt contact staff at the Board for assistance in filing the necessary 
documents within the statute of limitations period, made it clear Pruitt did not substantially 
comply with the statute.
680
 Affirming the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that 
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filing an affidavit for readiness for hearing nearly four years after an employer files a 
controversion of such claim does not substantially comply with the two-year statute of 
limitations imposed by the workers’ compensation statute.681 
 
Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. 
In Rosales v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc.,
682
 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’ 
Compensation Board (“Board”) has authority to approve global settlements of related claims in 
workers’ compensation cases.683 While working for Icicle Seafoods, Inc. (“Icicle”), Rosales was 
injured.
684
 He filed a report with the Board as well as a maritime lawsuit but later settled all his 
claims in a global settlement with Icicle, which the Board approved.
685
 When the Board 
subsequently refused to amend the settlement on Rosales’ request, he appealed to the supreme 
court arguing that the Board’s approval of the global settlement was invalid because it had no 
jurisdiction over his maritime claim.
 686
 The supreme court affirmed the Board’s decision, 
reasoning that even though Rosales could have pursued the two claims separately, the Board was 
not prohibited from settling both claims.
687
 Thus, according to the court, not amending Rosales’ 
global settlement was proper to bar double recovery for the same claim.
688
 Affirming the Board’s 
decision, the supreme court held that the Board has authority to approve global settlements of 
related claims in workers’ compensation cases.689 
 
FAMILY LAW 
Top   
 
Amy M. v. State  
In Amy M. v. State,
690
 the supreme court held that, in deciding whether a parent has been given a 
reasonable amount of time to remedy her conduct for purposes retaining parental rights, it is 
appropriate to consider his or her history of substance abuse in conjunction with present 
conduct.
691
 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) filed a petition for termination of Amy’s 
parental rights three months after her child, Kadin, tested positive for cocaine at birth.
692
 Amy 
had, up to that point, repeatedly failed to complete inpatient treatment programs, despite the 
requirements of her OCS case plan.
693
 However, between this filing and the start of the trial, 
Amy began taking steps towards a sober future.
694
 Nevertheless, the lower court concluded that 
Amy’s substance abuse placed Kadin in need of aid and that she failed to remedy the 
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corresponding conditions within a reasonable time.
695
 On appeal, Amy argued that she was not 
given a reasonable amount of time to remedy her substance abuse.
696
 The supreme court affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that to terminate parental rights, a parent must have failed 
to remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the child in substantial risk within a reasonable 
time.
697
 Here, according to the court, Amy did not take any concrete steps toward obtaining long-
term residential treatment, as required by her case plan, and her positive steps towards recovery 
were only very recent changes.
698
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held 
that, in deciding whether a parent has been given a reasonable amount of time to remedy her 
conduct for purposes of maintaining child custody, it is appropriate to consider his or her present 
conduct as well as his or her history of substance abuse.
699
 
 
Casey K. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services. 
In Casey K. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,700 the supreme court held that a delay by 
the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) in providing collateral information needed for a 
person’s substance abuse evaluation does not in and of itself make OCS’s efforts to reunify that 
person with their child unreasonable.
701
 In 2010, OCS began investigating Casey K., the mother 
of a young girl named Cheyenne, for substance abuse and neglect.
702
 OCS established a case 
plan for Casey, as well as a visitation schedule for Casey and Cheyenne, services for Casey 
during her subsequent incarceration and funding for Casey’s urine analysis and other 
assessments.
703
 Casey, however, took no action to remedy her conduct, avoided contact with 
OCS, and failed to complete all but two of four urine analyses.
704
 In 2011, Casey had an 
appointment for a substance abuse evaluation, but OCS failed to submit the required collateral 
information to the assessor.
705
 Relying on incomplete information, the assessor concluded that 
Casey did not require substance abuse treatment and the treatment Casey did in fact require was 
delayed by approximately one year.
706
 On appeal, Casey argued that OCS’s efforts to reunite her 
with Cheyenne were unreasonable because of the delay in providing the collateral information.
707
 
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that a brief lapse in OCS’s 
provision of services did not prevent a finding that OCS made reasonable efforts toward 
reunification.
708
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a delay by 
OCS in providing collateral information needed for a person’s substance abuse evaluation does 
not in and of itself make OCS’s efforts to reunify that person with their child unreasonable.709 
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Childs v. Childs 
In Childs v. Childs,
710
 the supreme court held that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (the 
“Act”) does not preclude the consideration of military service pay when modifying child support 
payments.
711
 In 2005, Joshua and Christina Childs dissolved their marriage.
712
 Joshua 
subsequently served in the United States Army.
713
 Accordingly, the lower court ordered the 
modification of his child support obligation to account for his military Basic Allowance for 
Housing.
714
 On appeal, Joshua argued that the Act precluded the lower court from ordering the 
modification because he was an active service member.
715
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that Joshua failed to show that his ability to present a defense was 
materially affected by his military duty.
716
 The supreme court further reasoned that a 
servicemember was not entitled to a stay against a civil action merely by virtue of serving.
717
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Act does not preclude the 
consideration of military service pay when modifying child support payments.
718
 
 
Christopher C. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Christopher C. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,719 the supreme court held that 
termination of parental rights is appropriate when active efforts to remedy the parents’ 
problematic behavior fail.
720
 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) attempted to improve 
both parents’ parenting skills, in addition to providing substance abuse counseling.721 However, 
OCS eventually filed a petition to terminate the parents’ rights after efforts to improve their 
parenting skills failed.
722
 The lower court granted the petition and terminated their parental rights 
because they did not remedy their behavior despite OCS’s active efforts to avoid a family 
breakup.
723
 On appeal, the parents challenged these findings without providing any evidence 
beyond their own testimony.
724
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning 
that each challenged finding was supported by appropriate evidence.
725
 The court further 
reasoned that while OCS’s efforts to keep the family together were imperfect, they qualified as 
active efforts.
726
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that termination of 
parental rights is appropriate when active efforts to remedy parents’ problematic behavior fail.727 
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Claudio P. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Claudio P. v. State, Dep’t. of Health and Social Services,728 the supreme court held that 
termination of parental rights is warranted when an incarcerated parent’s failure to adequately 
arrange care for a child renders the child a need in care.
729
 Claudio P. was incarcerated prior to 
the birth of his child.
730
 While incarcerated, he arranged for the mother to care for the child, but 
the child was placed into the custody of the Office for Children’s Services (“OCS”) when the 
mother’s parental rights were terminated.731 Ultimately, the lower court terminated Claudio’s 
parental rights as well.
732
 On appeal, Claudio argued that the lower court erred in its ruling 
because, even though he was incarcerated, he made reasonable plans for his child to be cared for 
by his parents if the child’s mother was not available.733 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that because it took Claudio over a year to take action to arrange care 
for his child following her placement in OCS custody, his efforts to plan for his child’s care were 
inadequate.
734
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that termination of 
parental rights is warranted when an incarcerated parent’s failure to adequately arrange care for a 
child renders the child a need in care.
735
 
 
Co v. Matson 
In Co v. Matson,
736
 the supreme court held that in child custody cases the statutory best-interest 
factors should determine custody rather than deference to an interim custody agreement.
737
 As 
part of a divorce proceeding between the husband, Co, and the wife, Matson, the two entered into 
an interim custody arrangement regarding their two children.
738
 Matson later moved to amend 
the interim agreement due to the inability of the parents to communicate adequately as well as 
other concerns about Co’s parenting.739 In resolving the custody dispute, the lower court 
determined that the children would benefit from sole legal custody residing in one parent and 
concluded that the majority of the statutory best-interest factors favored granting Matson this 
custody.
740
 On appeal, Co argued that the lower court had improperly weighed the evidence in 
applying the statutory best-interest factors and abused its discretion by disrupting the status quo 
of the interim custody agreement.
741
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the court had substantial discretion in weighing the evidence and was not 
obligated to maintain the status quo of the interim custody agreement.
742
 The court further 
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reasoned that such pre-trial interim agreements come second to considerations of the best 
interests of the children.
743
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in 
child custody cases it is the statutory best-interest factors that determine custody rather than 
deference to the status quo of an interim custody agreement.
744
 
 
David S. v. Jared H. & Connie H. 
In David S. v. Jared H. & Connie H.,
745
 the supreme court held that a biological parent’s 
repeated incarceration does not justify failure to communicate meaningfully his or her child.
746
 
David was not listed on his daughter’s birth certificate and had been incarcerated for most of her 
life.
747
 After the biological mother died, the lower court granted the child’s maternal 
grandparents’ petition to adopt her without David’s consent.748 On appeal, David argued this was 
improper because his failure to communicate meaningfully with his daughter was justified by his 
incarceration.
749
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
communication constraints resulting from the parent’s own conduct could never justify the 
parent’s failure to communicate.750 Thus, according to the court, David’s repeated incarceration 
from parole violations was a result of his own conduct and, consequently, made his failure 
unjustifiable and his consent in the proceeding unnecessary.
751
 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that a biological parent’s repeated incarceration dos not justify 
failure to communicate meaningfully with his or her child.
752
 
 
Glover v. Ranney 
In Glover v. Ranney,
753
 the supreme court held that in divorce agreements dividing retirement 
benefits from military pensions, courts can compel award of a survivor benefit allowing receipt 
of the same amount after the employee spouse’s death.754 Former spouses, Glover and Ranney, 
disputed whether a survivor benefit plan, from Glover’s military pension, should be divided 
despite not being mentioned in the divorce agreement.
755
 On appeal, Glover argued the benefit 
plan was outside of their agreement’s scope.756 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that a settlement equitably dividing retirement benefits implicitly included 
survivor benefits.
 757
 However, Ranney, who would receive 28.6% of Glover’s retired pay while 
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he was alive, should not be awarded 55% of it after his death.
758
 Affirming the lower court’s 
inclusion of survivor benefits but remanding for proper allocation, the supreme court held that in 
divorce agreements dividing retirement benefits from military pensions, courts can compel award 
of a survivor benefit allowing receipt of the same amount after the employee spouse’s death.759 
 
Harris v. Governale 
In Harris v. Governale,
760
 the supreme court held that a court must give weight to instances of 
domestic violence that occur outside the presence of the child when analyzing the child’s best 
interest during a custodial determination.
761
 Harris planned to move to Florida with her husband 
and sued Governale for sole custody of their child.
762
 After a trial, however, the lower court 
awarded primary physical custody to Governale.
763
 On appeal, Harris argued that it was error for 
the lower court to disregard an instance of alleged domestic violence between Governale and his 
current girlfriend only because it had taken place outside the presence of the child.
764
 The 
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that there was no requirement under 
the statute that a child be present during alleged domestic violence for it to be a factor in a 
custodial determination.
765
 Children, according to the court, do not need to see the domestic 
violence for it to affect their wellbeing.
766
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that a court must give weight to instances of domestic violence that occur outside the 
presence of the child when analyzing the child’s best interest during a custodial 
determinations.
767
 
 
Hawkins v. Williams 
In Hawkins v. Williams,
768
 the supreme court held that a grandparent seeking court-ordered 
visitation with a grandchild must prove by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the 
best interests of the child, even when the parents do not explicitly object to all types of 
visitation.
769
 In 2011, Hawkins fell out of contact with her daughter, Williams.
770
 Hawkins later 
filed a petition for grandparent visitation with Williams’ four children.771 At trial, Williams did 
not testify, but Williams’ husband, who had no general objections to visitation, was concerned 
with Hawkins seeing the children unannounced.
772
 On appeal, Hawkins argued that the lower 
court should not have applied the clear and convincing standard to the case because the parents 
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did not object to her visitation.
773
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that court-ordered visitation was different than other types of visitation because the 
former infringed on the family’s rights to make decisions relating to the care of their children.774 
The supreme court further reasoned that Williams and her husband did object to court-ordered 
visitation by opposing Hawkins’ petition and voicing the aforementioned concern.775 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a grandparent seeking court-ordered 
visitation with a grandchild must prove by clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the 
best interests of the child.
776
 
 
Irma E. v. State 
In Irma E. v. State,
777
 the supreme court held that an adult family member is entitled to a hearing 
to contest the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) placement decision if OCS denies him or 
her child custody.
778
 Irma took custody of her biological granddaughters after their mother 
became homeless.
779
 OCS then removed Irma’s granddaughters from her home because Irma 
allowed her son to live with them despite his alleged history of sexual abuse.
780
 OCS placed 
Irma’s granddaughters with a non-relative foster family and Irma repeatedly asked OCS to place 
the girls back with her.
781
 OCS denied Irma’s request and refused to grant a hearing on the 
matter.
782
 On appeal, Irma argued that OCS should have granted her a hearing.
783
 The supreme 
court reversed the lower court’s decision, explaining that OCS was required by statute to not 
only explain its basis for denying a child’s placement with an adult family member, but also to 
inform the adult family member of his or her right to request a hearing to review OCS’s 
decision.
784
 Accordingly, the court concluded that OCS’s denial of a hearing in this instance was 
improper.
785Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that an adult family 
member is entitled to a hearing to contest the OCS placement decision if OCS denies him or her 
child custody.
786
 
 
Kyle S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Kyle S. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,787 the supreme court held that efforts 
directed at a child in need can satisfy the active efforts requirements of the Indian Child Welfare 
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Act (“ICWA”).788 Jane, an Indian child, was taken into state custody after reports of physical 
abuse.
789
 Based on Jane’s substance abuse problems and her propensity to run away, the lower 
court determined that Jane was a child in need of aid.
790
 On appeal, Kyle S., Jane’s father, argued 
that the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) failed to make the statutorily required “active 
efforts” to prevent the family’s breakup.791 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, determining that OCS must address a family’s particular needs in determining what 
efforts to take.
792
 The supreme court reasoned that because Jane’s behavior was the cause of her 
adjudication as a child in need of aid, OCS could focus their efforts on Jane rather than on 
reunification with her family.
793
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held 
that efforts directed at a child in need can satisfy the active efforts requirements of the ICWA.
794
 
 
Mallory D. v. Malcolm D. 
In Mallory D. v. Malcolm D.,
795
 the supreme court held that a court is not required to impute full-
time income to a parent who could work full-time but chooses not to in order to accommodate 
their child’s scheduling needs.796 In 2009, Mallory and Malcolm divorced and split custody of 
their three children.
797
 Mallory worked thirty hours per week at eighteen dollars per hour.
798
 She 
testified that her schedule allowed her to drive her daughter to and from school but also that her 
applications for full-time employment were unsuccessful.
799
 The lower court held that it was 
required to impute full-time income to Mallory because she could work full-time but chose not to 
in order to meet her daughter’s scheduling needs.800 On appeal, Mallory argued that the lower 
court erred in doing so.
801
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, explaining that 
courts have broad discretion to impute income in cases of voluntary and unreasonable 
underemployment.
802
 Thus, the lower court, according to the supreme court, was not required to 
impute Mallory’s hypothetical full-time income because the statute “does not rigorously 
command pursuit of maximum earnings.
803
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that a court is not required to impute full-time income to a parent who could work full-
time but chooses not to in order to accommodate their child’s scheduling needs.804 
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Martin v. Martin 
In Martin v. Martin,
805
 the supreme court held that in a child custody case a lesser showing of 
change in circumstances is needed to modify a visitation schedule than the underlying custody 
provisions of a parenting agreement.
806
 Gregory and Melody Martin dissolved their marriage and 
formed a parenting agreement with shared physical custody of their children.
807
 When the 
Martins later filed cross-motions to modify the agreement, the lower court refused to modify the 
custody provisions because there were no substantial changes in circumstances to warrant 
modification.
808
 The lower court did, however, modify the visitation schedule, finding that these 
modifications were in the children’s best interests.809 On appeal, Gregory argued that it was error 
for the lower court to modify the visitation schedule while finding that there was no substantial 
change in circumstances.
810
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, noting that 
the lower court’s finding of no substantial change in the circumstances.811 Nevertheless, the 
lower court, as pointed out by the supreme court, did find that minimizing parental contact was 
in the children’s best interest due to “ongoing conflicts.”812 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme court held that in a child custody case a lesser showing of change in circumstances 
is needed to modify a visitation schedule than the underlying custody provisions of a parenting 
agreement.
813
 
 
Nancy M. v. John M. 
In Nancy M. v. John M.,
814
 the supreme held that it is not error for a court to consider the impact 
of a parent’s status as a renter and student on the stability factor during a custodial 
determination.
815
 The father, John M., owned his own house and worked as a tenured professor 
at the University of Alaska.
816
 The mother, Nancy M., had recently moved to California where 
she rented an apartment and was in the process of seeking admission to a doctoral program.
817
 
The lower court held that, in light of these facts, the stability factor in the custodial determination 
slightly favored the father.
818
 Consequently, the lower court awarded primary custody of their 
child to him.
819
 On appeal, Nancy argued that disfavoring a parent for renting and attending 
graduate school was error.
820
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning 
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that stability can take into account multiple factors.
821
 Thus, here, while the status of renter 
versus homeowner was not dispositive, the stability factor was further influenced by the mother’s 
general, undetermined plans for her future career and education.
822
 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that it is not error for a court to consider the impact of a parent’s 
status as a renter and student in regards to the stability of the household during a custodial 
determination.
823
 
 
Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Native Village of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,824 the supreme court 
held that clear and convincing evidence is necessary before departing from the Indian Child 
Welfare Act’s (“ICWA”) adoptive preferences.825 The Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) 
assumed custody of Dawn when she was four months old and placed her in a non-Native foster 
home.
826
 The Native Village of Tununak (the “Tribe”) intervened in Dawn’s case, arguing for 
placement with Dawn’s grandmother since adoptive preference must be given to the child’s 
extended family unless there is “good cause” for deviation.827 The lower court held that a 
preponderance of the evidence supported its conclusion that there was good cause to deviate 
from the ICWA adoptive preferences, however.
828
 On appeal, the Tribe argued that the good 
cause showing under the ICWA required clear and convincing evidence before departing from 
the Act’s adoptive preferences.829 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that Congress’ intent and the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ICWA 
favored overturning precedential use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in these 
circumstances.
830
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that clear and 
convincing evidence is necessary before departing from the ICWA’s adoptive preferences.831 
 
O’Neal v. Campbell 
In O’Neal v. Campbell,832 the supreme court held that a parent with equal joint custody may still 
be required to pay child support where there is a disparity in income between parents.
833
 O’Neal 
and Campbell had a daughter together.
834
 Campbell made less than half of O’Neal’s income.835 
In 2010, Campbell successfully petitioned the lower court for joint legal custody, shared physical 
custody and a child support order.
836
 O’Neal motioned for reconsideration of the child support 
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order since she had custody of their daughter fifty-percent of the time.
837
 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that child support payments were based on both 
the relative percentage of physical custody as well as the relative adjusted incomes of the 
parents.
838
 Thus, according to the court, awarding child support to Campbell was not an abuse of 
discretion under the circumstances.
839
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that a parent with equal joint custody may still be required to pay child support where there 
is a disparity in income between the parents.
840
 
 
Petrilla v. Petrilla 
In Petrilla v. Petrilla,
841
 the supreme court held that decisions denying motions to modify child 
support payments must be supported by a sufficient factual basis.
842
 Brian and Roxana Petrilla 
divorced and subsequently shared custody of their daughter until late 2011 when Brian began 
preparations to move to Nevada.
843
 Roxana sought to modify the child support payment, filing a 
motion to impute Brian’s income from 2011 to calculate the support amount.844 After an earlier 
determination that Brian’s imputable income was $44,387, Brian submitted a motion to modify 
the payments based on his new position in Nevada, which paid $33,000 per year.
845
 The lower 
court denied this motion reasoning that Brian had waited until an unfavorably high amount was 
imputed to begin searching for work.
846
 On appeal, Brian argued that the lower court had abused 
its discretion in denying his motion for modification despite his new salary information.
847
 The 
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court was required to 
make factual determinations before denying Brian’s motion.848 These determinations included 
Brian’s earning capability and the availability of higher paying jobs in Nevada.849 Reversing the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that decisions denying motions to modify child 
support payments must be supported by a sufficient factual basis.
850
 
 
Philip J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Philip J. v. State Department of Health & Social Services,
851
 the supreme court held that 
social workers’ failure to ensure an abusive father seeks aid does not render the workers’ efforts 
to reunify an Indian father with his family inadequate.
852
 Philip had a long documented history of 
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domestic abuse and sexual assault against his wife and children beginning in 2004.
853
 In April 
2010, soon after Philip had been released from prison, an Office of Children Services (“OCS”) 
family supervisor visited the family and identified safety threats including domestic violence, 
sexual abuse and substance abuse.
854
 As a result, the family supervisor took custody of Philip’s 
seven children, eventually placing them in their grandmother’s custody.855 Throughout 2010 
OCS attempted to engage Philip in a case plan to reunify him with his children, to which he 
refused to cooperate.
856
 The lower court eventually terminated Philip’s parental rights, ruling that 
his children were in need of aid.
857
 On appeal, Philip argued that OCS’s efforts to reunite him 
with his children were inadequate.
858
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the prolonged and continued efforts of OCS to encourage Philip to attend anger 
management, domestic violence and batter’s programs were sufficient.859 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that social workers’ failure to ensure an abusive father 
seeks aid does not render the workers’ reunification efforts inadequate.860 
 
Pfeil v. Lock 
In Pfeil v. Lock,
861
 the supreme court held that applying the Rose factors to the division of 
marital property in divorce is inappropriate when assets have been commingled.
862
 In 2011, Lock 
filed for divorce following four years of cohabitation and marriage.
863
 In dividing assets, the 
parties could agree how they would allocate ownership of the two homes they owned but 
disputed the distribution of a truck and a four-wheeler.
864
 On appeal, Lock argued for application 
of the Rose factors to their real property, treating their divorce as a rescission and returning both 
parties to the state they were in prior to marriage, but for application of different factors to the 
truck and four-wheeler.
865
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
while limiting equitable division to a single asset may be appropriate, applying Rose rescission 
principles to a single asset was not.
866
 Divorcing spouses, according to the court, have either 
maintained separate economic identities or they have not, and where economic identities and 
assets have been commingled, Rose rescission is not appropriate.
867
 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that applying the Rose factors to the division of marital property 
in divorce is inappropriate where assets have been commingled.
868
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Reilly v. Northrop 
In Reilly v. Northrop,
869
 the supreme court held that a parent could be voluntarily underemployed 
when more lucrative employment could be found outside the parent’s trained field.870 In 2003, 
Reilly and Vinnette had a child, while Reilly was working in Alaska as a drilling engineer.
871
 In 
2004, Reilly moved to Montana but was unable to obtain comparable employment and 
subsequently had a second child who, like his first child, had special needs.
872
 On appeal, Reilly 
argued that his child support payments should based on his current income and, consequently, 
should be reduced.
873
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
underemployment could be considered voluntary even if it was the result of failed good faith 
attempts to gain sufficient employment.
874
 Thus, the lower court did not err in imputing Reilly’s 
income based on the average income of workers in a similar field in southwest Montana.
875
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a parent could be found to be 
voluntarily underemployed when more lucrative employment could be found outside the parent’s 
trained field.
876
 
 
Ronny M. v. Nanette H. 
In Ronny M. v. Nanette H.,
877
 the supreme court held that the fact that the non-custodial parent 
earns a smaller income than the primary physical custodial parent does not constitute “good 
cause” to vary child support payments.878 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ronny M. and 
Nanette H. lived in Florida and had two children together.
879
 Eventually, the couple separated, 
with Nanette maintaining custody.
880
 In 2009, Nanette moved to Alaska with the two children.
881
 
In November 2010 Nanette filed in the lower court for sole legal and primary physical custody of 
the children as well as to receive child support payments.
882
 In 2011, the lower court ordered 
Ronny to pay Nanette $215 per month in child support.
883
 On appeal, Ronny argued that the 
lower court should have found “good cause” to vary the child support payments because Nanette 
had enough money to support the children without his payments that he could not afford.
884
 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that even though Nannette made 
more money than Ronny, the difference between their incomes did not amount to a showing of 
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manifest injustice, which is required to find good cause.
885
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme court held that the fact that the non-custodial parent earns a smaller income than the 
primary physical custodial parent does not constitute “good cause” to vary child support 
payments.
886
 
 
Rosenblum v. Perales 
In Rosenblum v. Perales,
887
 the supreme court held that a court is not barred from considering a 
parent’s military deployment when resolving a custody dispute.888 Perales sued Rosenblum, the 
father of her four-year-old son, for primary physical custody and shared legal custody.
889
 The 
trial court awarded custody to Perales.
890
 On appeal, Rosenblum argued that the trial court’s 
decision violated the law by taking into account his regular military deployments in determining 
custody.
891
 The law mandated that “a parent's temporary duty, mobilization, or deployment to 
military service and the resultant temporary disruption to the child of the parent may not be a 
factor in a court's [custody] decision.”892 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that “temporary” should be given its ordinary meaning.893 Therefore, Rosenblum’s 
recurring deployment for a third of every year was not temporary because each deployment 
continued beyond a limited period of time.
894
 Accordingly, it was also reasonable to conclude 
that the disruption this deployment schedule would cause to his son would not be temporary.
895
 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a court is not barred from 
considering a parent’s military deployment when resolving a custody dispute.896 
 
Schaub v. Schaub 
In Schaub v. Schaub,
897
 the supreme court held that laches do not bar the prospective division of 
retirement benefits pursuant to a marriage dissolution.
898
 Theresa and “Hank” Schaub separated 
in 1986.
899
 In 1992, Hank petitioned the court to dissolve their marriage, representing that he had 
made diligent efforts but had been unable to locate Theresa.
900
 Subsequently, in 2010, Theresa 
filed a motion seeking a post-decree equitable distribution of their property.
901
 On appeal, Hank 
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raised the defense of laches because it had taken Theresa many years to petition the court.
902
 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that laches did not bar the division 
of Hank’s future retirement benefits.903 Here, Hank would not suffer unreasonable prejudice 
from this prospective division, while Theresa would certainly be prejudiced if denied her 
share.
904
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that laches do not bar the 
prospective division of retirement benefits to a marriage dissolution.
905
 
 
Sherman v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services 
In Sherman v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services,906 the supreme court held that parents 
who neglect to comply with Office of Child Services (“OCS”) developed case plans may be 
deemed to have failed to remedy previous abandonment of their child.
907
 In 2012, OCS took 
custody of Sherman’s son, Kadin, after determining that both Kadin and his mother tested 
positive for cocaine.
908
 OCS had previously removed Sherman’s other three children from his 
care for the exact same reason.
909
 Soon thereafter, OCS developed a case plan wherein Sherman 
could regain custody of Kadin if he submitted to psychological tests, provided OCS with housing 
and income information and attended monthly case planning meetings.
910
 After refusing to 
follow nearly every aspect of the case plan, the lower court terminated Sherman’s rights to 
Kadin.
911
 On appeal, Sherman argued that he neither abandoned nor failed to remedy Kadin’s 
abandonment.
912
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that, in failing 
to participate in nearly every aspect of the case plan, Sherman had both abandoned and failed to 
remedy such abandonment
913
 The court further reasoned that this conclusion was only 
strengthened by Sherman’s continued secrecy and recalcitrance towards OCS caseworkers.914 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that parents who neglect to comply 
with OCS developed case plans may be deemed to have failed to remedy previous abandonment 
of their child.
915
 
 
Swaney v. Granger 
In Swaney v. Granger,
916
 the supreme court held that modification of child support orders in 
existence before the initial motion for modification is served on the opposing party is 
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improper.
917
 In 2005, the lower court granted Granger and Swaney a divorce and issued a child 
custody and support order covering their four minor children.
918
 In 2008, Granger filed a motion 
to modify the child custody and support order.
919
 The lower court subsequently granted the 
motion.
920
 The court, however, only modified the custody aspect of the order, leaving the child 
support aspect to be determined later.
921
 Three years later the lower court revisited the issue and 
modified the child support aspect of the order as well, retroactively changing the amount of 
several of the child support payments due to be paid before the motion for modification was 
served on Swaney in 2008.
922
 On appeal, Swaney argued that modifying child support orders in 
this manner violated Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3.
923
 The supreme court reversed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3 prohibited the 
retroactive modification of existing child support orders for the period before the motion for 
modification was served on the opposing party.
924
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that modification of child support orders in existence before the initial 
motion for modification is served on the opposing party is improper.
925
 
 
Urban v. Urban 
In Urban v. Urban,
926
 the supreme court held that in a divorce proceeding, a court may rely on 
property tax assessments over a real estate agent’s estimate.927 In their divorce proceeding, 
Martha and Delbert Urban disagreed on the value of land they owned.
928
 The lower court 
ultimately valued the couple’s property based on a tax assessment.929 On appeal, Delbert argued 
that the superior court erred in its property valuation.
930
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that since the lower court’s decision was reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, its decision that the tax assessment was more reliable than the realtor’s opinion was 
not reversible error.
931
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that reliance 
on tax valuation in regards to property appraisal is reasonable.
932
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Wagner v. Wagner 
In Wagner v. Wagner,
933
 the supreme court held that courts have a duty to inform a pro se litigant 
of the proper procedure for an action when the litigant exhibits behavior that constitutes a lack of 
familiarity with the rules.
934
 Felicia and Richard Wagner married in 1993.
935
 When Felicia filed 
for divorce in 2010 there was a dispute about the division of marital property.
936
 Richard failed 
to appear at three of the four pre-trial conferences and at trial but had called the court’s legal 
secretary to ask for a continuance prior to three of his four absences.
937
 Richard’s requests were 
never granted and he was never warned of the proper procedure for requesting a continuance.
938
 
At trial, the court determined that, based on Richard’s repeated absence, it had no choice but to 
determine that his absence from trial was voluntary and thus made several findings of fact and 
conclusions of law based on Felicia’s testimony alone.939 On appeal, Richard argued that the 
court erred in concluding that his absence was voluntary and in proceeding to trial without 
him.
940
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Richard’s 
continued attempts to request a continuance by calling the court’s secretary evidenced his belief 
that he was utilizing the appropriate procedure.
941
 Based on this belief, combined with the fact 
that the lower court never ordered Richard to cease calling for continuances or advised him that 
he needed to file a motion for continuance, the court further reasoned that Richard’s behavior 
constituted a lack of familiarity with the rules and thus was a legitimate request for 
continuance.
942
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held courts have a duty 
to inform a pro se litigant of the proper procedure for an action when the litigant exhibits 
behavior that constitutes a lack of familiarity with the rules.
943
  
 
Wanner-Brown v. Brown 
In Wanner-Brown v. Brown,
944
 the supreme court held that all retirement benefits vested during 
the course of a marriage are considered marital property regardless of when the retirement 
classification status was determined.
945
 Prior to his marriage, Conrad worked for the State in a 
position with a retirement classification of Tier 1.
946
 He later left his position and cashed out his 
retirement benefits.
947
 After his marriage to Tammy, Conrad again became employed by the 
State and completely re-earned his retirement benefits during the course of the marriage.
948
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While new employees at this time were classified as Tier 2, Conrad was able to retain his Tier 1 
classification due to this prior employment with the State.
949
 The Tier 1 status allowed Conrad to 
receive full retirement benefits five years earlier, resulting in an almost $80,000 increase in the 
present value of his benefits.
950
 After Conrad filed for divorce, the lower court determined that 
Conrad should be classified as a Tier 2 employee when determining the distribution of marital 
assets because his Tier 1 status was acquired before the marriage.
951
 The supreme court reversed 
the lower court’s decision, reasoning that all benefits obtained during a marriage are marital 
property.
952
 As Conrad re-earned all his benefits during the marriage, his benefits should have 
been classified as Tier 1 when determining the distribution of marital assets.
953
 Reversing the 
lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that all retirement benefits vested during the 
course of a marriage are considered marital property regardless of when the retirement 
classification status was determined.
954
 
 
Wilhour v. Wilhour 
In Wilhour v. Wilhour,
955
 the supreme court held that factual disputes over a parent’s potential 
future income necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine child support payments.
956
 After 
Joshua Wilhour relocated to move closer to his son, the lower court still used his previous 
income to determine his child support payments.
957
 His new income following relocation was 
substantially less than before, but Jacqueline Wilhour argued that the reduction was merely 
temporary.
958
 On appeal, he argued that the factual dispute over his income necessitated an 
evidentiary hearing that was denied by the lower court.
959
 The supreme court reversed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that there was a genuine factual dispute over whether Joshua’s 
income reduction was temporary or permanent.
960
 Additionally, according to the court, any 
income change resulting from a parent moving closer to his or her child should rarely weigh 
against that parent.
961
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that factual 
disputes over a parent’s potential future income necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine 
child support payments.
962
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HEALTH LAW 
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In re Stephen O. 
In In re Stephen O.,
963
 the supreme court held that in an involuntary commitment hearing, the 
court must consider whether the psychiatric patient is able to live safely outside of a controlled 
environment.
964
 In 2004 Stephen had heard voices that made him fearful and led him to seriously 
injure himself by jumping off a 16 to 18 foot ledge.
965
 In 2009, Stephen claimed he began 
hearing the voice of Jesus telling him to repent and start attending church.
966
 Accordingly, the 
lower court found Stephen gravely disabled and ordered his involuntary commitment to a mental 
facility and for his involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs.
967
 The supreme court 
reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that in determining whether a patient is severely 
disabled, the court is not to consider if commitment would be preferable or in the patient’s best 
interest but whether the patient can live safely without commitment.
968
 The lower court’s 
reliance upon hearsay, the patient’s history involving markedly different symptoms and his 
willingness to receive medical treatment all corroborate against a finding of being severely 
disabled.
969
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in involuntary 
commitment hearings, the court must consider whether the patient is able to live safely outside of 
a controlled environment.
970
 
 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Top   
 
Villars v. Villars 
In Villars v. Villars,
971
 the supreme court held that, as her immigration sponsor, a former 
husband’s obligation to support his non-citizen ex-wife was correctly adjusted for the time 
daughter did not live with the ex-wife, the ex-wife’s move to a different state and the ex-wife’s 
earnings.
972
 Richard Villars sponsored Olga Villars’ immigration to America.973 The couple 
ultimately divorced in 2009 with a decree maintaining his sponsoring obligation.
974
 Olga then 
moved from Alaska to California and married Nasif in late 2009.
975
 From January to November 
2010, Richard did not pay any support to Olga causing her to file a motion for those payments.
976
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The lower court found that Olga was not owed that support, however.
977
 On appeal, Olga 
challenged the lower court’s use of California’s lower federal poverty level, the time she and her 
daughter had lived separately and her 2010 earnings in its calculations.
978
 The supreme court 
affirmed the method used by the lower court, reasoning that support obligations must be adjusted 
down when a family member leaves the household.
979
 Additionally, the court reasoned that the 
applicable poverty level was the state where the potential recipient was currently living and that 
support obligations should also be offset by any earned income.
980
 Affirming the lower court’s 
calculation method, the supreme court held that, as her immigration sponsor, a former husband’s 
obligation to support his non-citizen ex-wife was correctly adjusted.
981
 
 
INSURANCE LAW 
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Dearlove v. Campbell 
In Dearlove v. Campbell,
982
 the supreme court held that voluntary pre-trial payments are 
sometimes included in the recipient’s total recovery for purposes of Alaska Civil Rule 68 
analysis.
983
 In a two-car collision, Dearlove, the driver of the first vehicle, collided with and 
injured Campbell, a passenger in the second vehicle.
984
 Campbell’s insurance covered 
Campbell’s medical bills of $20,000 and established a subrogation claim against Dearlove.985 
Dearlove first offered to settle with Campbell for $18,000, but Campbell denied the offer 
because it would have left her responsible for the subrogation claim.
986
 Subsequently, Dearlove’s 
insurance company paid the subrogation claim of $20,000 to Campbell’s insurance company.987 
Dearlove then made a second settlement offer of $5,000, which Campbell rejected as well.
988
 A 
jury later returned a total award of $3,870 for Campbell and both parties claimed prevailing party 
status and, accordingly, moved for attorneys’ fees under Rule 68.989 The lower court ruled that 
Dearlove should be awarded attorney’s fees accrued after the second offer.990 On appeal, 
Dearlove argued that she should be awarded attorney’s fees accrued after the first offer as 
well.
991
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that not including the 
subrogation payment in Campbell’s total recovery to be compared to the first offer to determine 
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if Dearlove was entitled to attorney’s fees could lead to abusive settlement practices.992 Thus, 
according to the court, attorney’s fees accrued by Dearlove between her two settlement offers 
was not available because Campbell’s recovery to be compared to Dearlove’s offer of $18,000 
was $23,870.
993
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that voluntary pre-
trial payments are sometimes included in the recipient’s total recovery for purposes of Rule 68 
analysis.
994
 
 
McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
In McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
995
 the supreme court held that 
personal injury claims are not subject to statutorily mandated appraisal under Alaska’s insurance 
code.
996
 In 2007, McDonnell and her son were in a car accident.
997
 McDonnell claimed both her 
and her son suffered back injuries from this accident.
998
 State Farm, McDonnell’s insurer, 
however, did not believe the aforementioned accident was the source of all the claimed 
injuries.
999
 Unable to settle, McDonnell asked for a declaratory judgment arguing that, 
statutorily, her claims were entitled to mandatory appraisal.
1000
 Subsequently, the lower court 
granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
1001
 On appeal, McDonnell argued again for 
the application of mandatory appraisal to her claims.
1002
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that the statutorily mandated appraisal applied to, among other things, 
personal property.
1003
 Thus, according to the court, given the context, personal injury claims 
were not included in personal property and, consequently, fell outside the statute’s bounds.1004 
Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that personal injury claims are not 
subject to statutorily mandated appraisal.
1005
 
 
SOP, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources 
In SOP, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources,1006 the supreme court held that a state park 
issuing special use permits not revocable at will create unconstitutional easements over public 
land.
1007
 The Nancy Lake State Recreation Area (the “Park”) granted numerous special use 
permits that allowed private land owners to use ATVs on Park trails to access their remote 
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properties.
1008
 As these properties became more populated, ATV usage rose considerably, 
damaging the wildlife and vegetation surrounding the trails.
1009
 SOP, Inc. sued to enjoin the Park 
from issuing these special use permits.
1010
 On appeal, the Park argued that the permits were mere 
licenses within the scope of the Park’s authority to grant.1011 The supreme court reversed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the permits constituted appurtenant easements because the 
permits were revocable only for cause and every remote private property owner who applied 
received a permit on the basis of owning property in that area.
1012
 The court further reasoned 
that, as easements, the permits constituted an impermissible, unconstitutional disposal of state 
park land.
1013
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a state park 
issuing special use permits not revocable at will create unconstitutional easements over public 
land.
1014
 
 
United Services Automobile Association v. Neary 
In United Services Automobile Association v. Neary,
1015
 the supreme court held that the number 
of insureds does not affect an explicit per-occurrence policy limit.
1016
 While handling his father’s 
gun a minor accidently shot two friends with a single bullet, killing one and injuring the 
other.
1017
 The parents of the victims sued the minor, his parents and their insurer, United Services 
Automobile Association (“USAA”).1018 The parents’ plan, which covered themselves and their 
son, included a limit of liability provision that limited the coverage of each occurrence to 
$300,000.
1019
 The policy further stated that the total liability for USAA under the plan resulting 
from any one occurrence would not be greater than that limit regardless of the number of 
insureds.
1020
 The lower court held that each of the insureds were subject to an independent per-
occurrence limit, resulting in potential liability of up to $900,000 for USAA.
1021
 On appeal, 
USAA argued that the per-occurrence limit was not dependent on the number of insureds.
1022
 
The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that while ambiguities should 
be construed in favor of the insured, the language of this policy was clear and unambiguous.
1023
 
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the number of insureds does 
not affect an explicit per-occurrence policy limit.
1024
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MARITIME LAW 
Top   
 
Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC 
In Janes v. Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC,
1025
 the supreme court held that a plaintiff who asserts 
that a shipowner’s failure to provide safer, alternative devices or methods that renders a vessel 
unseaworthy bears the initial burden of proving that the alternative devices or methods are 
feasible.
1026
 Janes, a railroad conductor, sued Alaska Railbelt Marine, LLC, for injuries he 
suffered while loading railcars owned by the corporation onto a barge via a set of tracks.
1027
 
Janes alleged that placing cargo onto the tracks and failing to provide devices to sTop      moving 
railcars from hitting the non-rail cargo made the barge unseaworthy.
1028
 At trial, the lower court 
found that Janes had not demonstrated that safer alternatives for stopping the railcars existed, 
and, consequently, his unseaworthiness claim must fail.
1029
 On appeal, Janes argued that the 
lower court erred in requiring him to prove the feasibility of alternatives for stopping the 
railcars.
1030
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that because Janes’ 
theories of unseaworthiness posited that the barge was not reasonably fit due to the failure to 
provide one of two alternative stopping devices, it was critical that the devices would work the 
way that Janes claimed they would.
1031
 Thus, according to the court, since Janes’s 
unseaworthiness claim depended on a showing that additional stopping devices were needed to 
make the barge reasonably fit, Jane’s lack of demonstration was dispositive.1032 Affirming the 
lower court, the supreme court held that a plaintiff who claims unseaworthiness based on a 
shipowner’s failure to provide safer, alternative devices or methods bears the burden of proving 
the feasibility of the alternative devices or methods.
1033
 
 
PROPERTY LAW 
Top   
 
Beals v. Beals 
In Beals v. Beals,
1034
 the supreme court held that absent evidence of intent to keep property 
separate it will be considered marital.
1035
 The Bealses married in 2000 and divorced in 2011.
1036
 
Prior to the marriage Mark Beals owned a home at 534 Second Avenue.
1037
 The couple 
refinanced this home in order to convert $42,092 of equity to cash, which was used to purchase 
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an adjacent lot.
1038
 Since this cash could be “easily tracked and separated from the marital 
assets,” the lower court decided Mark was entitled to $42,092 of lot’s $45,000 worth.1039 On 
appeal, Patricia argued that Mark had not presented evidence sufficient to characterize the 
adjacent lot as separate property and was thus subject to marital distribution.
1040
 The supreme 
court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that except where marriage is short and no 
commingling of assets has occurred, property is presumed marital absent evidence of intent to 
the contrary.
1041
 Here, the adjacent lot was titled in both Mark’s and Patricia’s names.1042 
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that absent evidence of an intent to 
keep property separate the property will be considered marital.
1043
  
 
Burke v. Maka 
In Burke v. Maka,
1044
 the supreme court held that the doctrine of laches precludes a party from 
challenging the validity of a covenant where the party knew of the shared use yet failed to assert 
a right to exclusive use for more than four years.
1045
 Lot 9A shared a driveway with adjacent Lot 
9B.
1046
 In 2001, the owner of both lots filed a covenant granting each lot access to a shared 
driveway.
1047
 However, this covenant was not recorded until 2004.
1048
 The Burkes, purchased 
Lot 9A in 2004.
1049
 Although they were unaware of the covenant, the Burkes stipulated that its 
recording before the sale placed them on constructive notice.
1050
 Further, the Burkes did not 
object when the owner of 9B utilized the shared driveway.
1051
 It was not until 2009 that the 
Burkes contested the covenant, filing suit to quiet title, arguing that the covenant was invalid.
1052
 
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that evidence of the Burke’s 
knowledge of the covenant combined with their failure to object to the shared use of the 
driveway for more than four years constituted an unreasonable delay in seeking relief that 
consequently prejudiced the owners of Lot 9B.
1053
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that the doctrine of laches precludes a party from challenging the validity of a 
covenant where the party knew of the shared use yet failed to assert a right to exclusive use for 
more than four years.
1054
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Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
In Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP,
1055
 the supreme court held that the ten-year statute of 
limitations is inapplicable to tort claims that are merely attendant to an underlying claim 
involving an ownership interest in property.
1056
 In response to Petro Alaska’s President and 
majority shareholder personally acquiring a piece of property that was intended to belong to the 
corporation, the corporation’s shareholders filed a derivative action for fiduciary fraud, 
fraudulent conveyance, legal malpractice, and civil conspiracy against the corporation’s former 
attorneys.
1057
 The superior court dismissed the shareholders’ derivative action, finding that the 
claims were time-barred.
1058
 On appeal, the shareholders argued that the superior court erred in 
refusing to apply a ten-year statute of limitations to the conspiracy and fraudulent conveyance 
claims which were related to the acquisition of the property at issue.
1059
 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the ten-year statute of limitations did not 
apply to the civil conspiracy and fraudulent conveyance claims because the claims did not 
directly involve the determination of a right or claim to or interest in the underlying real 
property.
1060
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court held that the statute’s ten-year 
limitations period does not apply to tort claims that are merely attendant to an underlying claim 
involving a property interest.
1061
  
 
Griffin v. Weber 
In Griffin v. Weber,
1062
 the supreme court held that the burden of proof to reform a quitclaim 
deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the transaction testify that they 
understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the transaction.1063 In 2009, Weber 
agreed to cosign a refinanced mortgage that Griffin wanted to take out on her property.
1064
 
Before taking out the mortgage, Griffin executed a quitclaim deed to transfer ownership of her 
property from only herself to herself and Weber.
1065
 In 2010, Griffin wanted to refinance again, 
this time with her fiancé as cosigner.
1066
 The bank asked that Weber relinquish his interest in the 
property first, this dispute arose and Griffin asked the court to reform the 2009 deed into a 
security instrument.
1067
 At trial, Griffin testified that a purpose of the transaction was to provide 
security to Weber in case she defaulted on the mortgage.
1068
 Furthermore, Weber testified that 
the purpose of the quitclaim deed was to secure his interest in the loan in case something 
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happened to Weber.
1069
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the 
parties’ testimonies provided the clear and convincing evidence necessary to show that a security 
was intended.
1070
 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the burden of 
proof to reform a quitclaim deed into a security agreement is met when both parties to the 
transaction testify that they understood the deed’s purpose was to provide security for the 
transaction.
1071
 
 
McCarrey v. Kaylor 
In McCarrey v. Kaylor,
1072
 the supreme court held that the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act (“FLPMA”) does not terminate classifications created by the Small Tract Act.1073 The 
Kaylors owned a property directly adjacent to a property owned by the McCarreys.
1074
 The 
McCarreys’ property lot had its origins in the Small Tract Act, an act that authorized the sale of 
public lands to private parties.
1075
 Furthermore, the deed accompanying the McCarrey lot 
reserved a fifty-foot right-of-way that allowed access to a section of the Kaylor lot.
1076
 
Eventually, the McCarreys planned to build a fence that would restrict the Kaylors use of the 
right-of-way.
1077
 The Kaylors then commenced this action to establish a prescriptive easement 
and obtain an injunction preventing the erection of the proposed fence.
1078
 On appeal, the 
McCarreys argued that the right-of-way on their land was terminated when the Small Tract Act 
was repealed by the FLPMA.
1079
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
explaining that the right-of-way survived the repeal of the Small Tract Act because the FLPMA 
did not explicitly terminate the classifications created by the Small Tract Act, one of which 
formed the basis for this right-of-way.
1080
 The court further reasoned that such classifications 
survived since the Bureau of Land Management’s regulations stated that the classifications 
created by the Small Tract Act remained effective despite the Act’s repeal.1081 Furthermore, the 
court noted that the FLPMA was limited in scope to public lands and that it probably did not 
affect the private land interests involved here.
1082
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) does not 
terminate classifications created by the Small Tract Act. 
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Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc. 
In Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc.,
1083
 the supreme court held that the 
determination of aircraft ownership is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
(“FAA”) authority.1084 In 2010, Schweitzer filed a claim of exemption to prevent the seizure of 
an incomplete airplane in his possession as satisfaction of Salamatof Air Park Subdivision 
Owners, Inc.’s (the “Association”) monetary judgment against him.1085 Over Schweitzer’s 
contentions that the plane was the property of a third party, the lower court determined that the 
incomplete plane was salvaged from parts of one of Schweitzer’s planes and therefore was his 
property.
1086
 On appeal, Schweitzer argued that the court could not make the ownership decision 
because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
1087
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that the lower court did not need statutory authorization to rule as it did since 
the court had the inherent power to resolve property ownership disputes.
1088
 The court further 
reasoned that while federal regulations governed the assignment of identification by airplane 
manufacturers, nothing in the regulations restricted the lower court’s power to look beyond the 
airplane’s registration number to determine ownership.1089 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme court held that the determination of aircraft ownership is not preempted by the 
FAA’s authority.1090 
 
Stanhope v. Stanhope 
In Stanhope v. Stanhope,
1091
 the supreme court held that in an equitable division of marital assets 
proceeding, it is reasonable to award a contested marital residence to the party with the ability to 
afford for the property’s upkeep and mortgage.1092 In 2010, Kenneth divorced his wife, 
Maryna.
1093
 At the time of the divorce, Kenneth was disabled and considered unable to hold a 
job, while Maryna worked as a janitor.
1094
 During proceedings to equally divide the marital 
property, the superior court found that Maryna, due to her job, was in a better position to pay the 
home’s mortgage and upkeep, awarding her the marital residence.1095 On appeal, Kenneth argued 
that the lower court erred by awarding Maryna the residence because he was dependent on the 
house.
1096
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court 
did not abuse its discretion weighing the different factors in the case, ultimately awarding the 
home to the person who could afford to maintain the residence.
1097
 Kenneth’s poor health, 
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inability to work and destruction of a number of marital assets were properly weighed against 
Maryna’s recent immigration, modest earning capacity as a janitor and lack of health 
problems.
1098
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that in an equitable 
division of marital assets proceeding, it is reasonable to award the contested marital residence to 
the party with the ability to afford for the property’s upkeep and mortgage.1099 
 
Windel v. Mat-Su Title Insurance Agency, Inc. 
In Windel v. Mat-Su Title Insurance Agency, Inc.,
1100
 the supreme court held that easements on 
property owned by tenants by the entirety but missing a co-grantor’s signature can nonetheless 
be valid.
1101
 Windel purchased a parcel of land from the Davises, tenants by the entirety who 
jointly had recorded a fifty-foot-wide easement for a public road on the property.
1102
 Carnahan 
purchased land adjacent to Windel’s property and upgraded the road.1103 Windel sued Carnahan 
for trespass and argued that the easement was invalid.
1104
 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that despite Mrs. Davis’ absent signature on the easement’s 
recording, the easement was valid under the doctrine of ratification.
1105
 Mrs. Davis’ silence 
ratified the easement conveyance.
1106
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that easements on property owned by tenants by the entirety but missing a co-grantor’s 
signature can nonetheless be valid.
1107
 
 
TORT LAW 
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Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc. 
In Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc.,
1108
 the supreme court held that lack of direct evidence of a bar patron’s 
intoxication is not necessarily fatal at the summary judgment stage to a claim under the dram 
shop statute.
1109
 Morrell went drinking at a bar and fatally stabbed Kalenka in a fight later that 
night.
1110
 Kalenka’s estate representative brought a wrongful death action against the bar, 
claiming that the bar violated the dram shop statute by serving Morrell alcohol when he was 
drunk.
1111
 Under the dram shop statute, a bar serving alcohol to a drunk patron is civilly liable 
for damages caused by the patron’s intoxication.1112 Nevertheless, the bar won its summary 
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judgment motion because there was no direct evidence of Morrell’s drunken state at the bar.1113 
On appeal, Kalenka’s estate argued that a jury could have inferred that Morrell was visibly 
intoxicated based on his later behavior.
1114
 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that if an issue of material fact remained, summary judgment should not be 
granted.
1115
 Here, according to the court, there was still the question of material fact regarding 
whether the bar servers should have noticed Morrell’s intoxication.1116 Reversing the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that lack of direct evidence of a bar patron’s intoxication 
is not necessarily fatal at the summary judgment stage to a claim under the dram shop statute.
1117
 
 
Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage,
1118
 the supreme court held that “garden-variety” 
mental anguish claims do not waive physician and psychotherapist privileges.
1119
 Two former 
police officers brought claims against the Municipality of Anchorage for racial discrimination, 
claiming damages for mental anguish.
1120
 The Municipality sought discovery concerning the 
nature of the officers’ mental anguish claims, requesting the officers’ medical and counseling 
records.
1121
 Subsequently, the lower court granted the Municipality’s motion to compel.1122 On 
appeal, the officers argued that claims for the sort of mental anguish that any normal person 
would experience under the circumstances did not place their emotional conditions at issue, and, 
accordingly, did not waive the privilege that protected these records during discovery.
1123
 The 
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that although discovery of a 
patient’s medical records may be compelled when serious psychological conditions such as 
depression are claimed, similar compulsion would not be granted for garden-variety mental 
anguish claims, such as claims of anger, disappointment and sadness.
1124
 Reversing the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that “garden-variety” mental anguish claims do not 
waive physician and psychotherapist privileges.
1125
 
 
Lum v. Koles 
In Lum v. Koles,
1126
 the supreme court held that unlawful entry by a police officer does not make 
any subsequent use of force per se unreasonable.
1127
 After receiving a domestic disturbance 
emergency telephone call from a third party, police officers entered the Lum’s apartment without 
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knocking or announcing their presence.
1128
An altercation ensued and the police officers pepper 
sprayed and handcuffed Daniel Lum.
1129
 After the Lums sued the officers for excessive force and 
unlawful entry, the lower court granted summary judgment for the officers based on qualified 
immunity.
1130
 On appeal, the Lums argued that the unlawful entry and subsequent acts of force 
should be considered together, defeating the officers’ qualified immunity by making their use of 
force per se unreasonable.
1131
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning 
that, in an excessive force analysis, the court must look solely at the use of force at the time the 
force was applied.
1132
 Thus, according to the court, unlawful entry does not make applied force 
per se unreasonable and, consequently, the force ultimately used here was reasonable at the time 
it was applied.
1133
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that unlawful 
entry by a police officer does not make any subsequent use of force per se unreasonable.
1134
 
 
Maness v. Daily 
In Maness v. Daily,
1135
 the supreme court held that qualified immunity protected state troopers 
from excessive force claims.
1136
 Maness had fled from state troopers, who pursued him until a 
police department officer shot him non-fatally.
1137
 Subsequently, Maness brought claims of 
excessive force against the troopers.
1138
 Finding the troopers were public servants protected by 
qualified immunity, the lower court granted summary judgment.
1139
 On appeal, Maness argued 
that officers may be liable for excessive force if they violate the Fourth Amendment by 
provoking a violent confrontation.
1140
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that qualified immunity protected police officers’ exercise of discretionary 
functions.
1141
 The court further reasoned that, regarding excessive force claims, the officer’s 
conduct must be objectively reasonable or he must reasonably believe his conduct was lawful 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer.
1142
 Here, the troopers’ actions were objectively 
reasonable.
1143
 Affirming that lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that qualified 
immunity protected state troopers from excessive force claims.
1144
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Wiersum v. Harder 
In Wiersum v. Harder,
1145
 the supreme court held that landowners do not have a duty to their 
neighbors to prevent unreasonable risks of harm caused by third parties.
1146
 Harder brought a 
timber trespass action against his neighbors, the Wiersums, seeking damages after he discovered 
that the Wiersums had cut down trees on his property.
1147
 In their answer, the Wiersums filed a 
third-party complaint against a another neighbor, Wietfeld, alleging that she negligently 
misrepresented to the Wiersums that she owned the property in between her home and their 
home and granted them permission to cut down the trees.
1148
 The lower court dismissed the claim 
against Wietfeld holding that she did not owe a duty to the Wiersums.
1149
 On appeal, the 
Wiersums argued that Wietfeld was liable because she negligently misrepresented or failed to 
disclose information to the Wiersums and that Wietfeld owed a broad duty to her neighbors to 
prevent unreasonable risks of harm.
1150
 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that claims for negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose require a business 
transaction between the parties, which was not present in this case.
1151
 The court further reasoned 
that Wietfeld owed no broad duty of care to her neighbors since there was no statute, regulation, 
contract or case law supporting such a liability theory.
1152
 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme court held that landowners do not have a duty to their neighbors to prevent 
unreasonable risks of harm caused by third parties.
1153
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